“NATO’s –EU’s Strategic Defence and Security Review”, Maj. Gen. (ret) Polychronis Nalmpantis’ speech at NATO Advanced Research Workshop and National Intelligence Academy of Romania, with theme “Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine”, in Bucharest, September 28-29, 2015.


«For those who make wise decisions are more formidable to their enemies than those who rush madly into strong action[1]».


Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War

Thank you Mrs. Chairman,

Distinguished Guests, Fellow Conference Participants,

Ladies and Gentleman,

Let me to express my warm congratulations to the organizers and especially to Professor Cristian Barna for this excellent workshop.

I consider that it is great honor for me to participate as speaker in such an interesting international workshop, that analyzes in depth the “Hybrid Warfare and the Ukrainian crisis”. Therefore, I have the opportunity to offer you a few summary aspects and remarks regarding the topic “NATO’s – EU’s Strategic Defence and Security Review”.



Historically, states’ defence reviews are undertaken to plan and to assign their defence policy, as well as the necessary resources and means to achieve national objectives that are related to defend national security at home and to protect and to provide projection of the national interest abroad.[2]

Nowadays, there are numerous emergencies in NATO’s and the European Union’s perimeter strategic neighborhood, whereas hybrid threats that have been arisen by Russia; threaten the security of Eastern European states.[3]

Diagram 1: Hybrid Warfare

 Diagram 1 Hybrid Warfare


Source: Munich Security Report 2015 – Munich Security Conference, p.35


Also, years of uncoordinated cuts in defence spending of member states are noticed[4], while European defence spending continued the downward trajectory seen since the 2008 economic crisis and in 2014 was cumulatively 7.7% lower than in 2010.[5]

Diagram 2: European Defence Spending by Country (2014)

 Diagram 2 European Defence Spending by Country (2014)

Source: Military Balance 2015 – The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p.61

In parallel, the arc of instability has almost enclosed the European continent by Putin’s military intervention in Ukraine and the zone of conflict has been extended from Northern Africa and the Middle East to Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Islamic State has brought jihadism to new levels of violence and brutality in the Middle East.[6]

Diagram 3: Ukrainian Crisis

 Diagram 3 Ukrainian Crisis

Source: Ukraine National & Defence Council

Thus, the global security environment is becoming increasingly unpredictable and unstable, while a new balance of power caused by a shift in the world’s economic and political centre of gravity from the northern Atlantic towards Asia, entails changing of geopolitical dynamics and strategic uncertainty, the opening of sea lanes in the Arctic, the increased power of non-state actors, the mass migrations and also the progressive substitution of European countries for the leading of military power.[7] On this last issue, German Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, expressed a positive policy with the “Leadership from the Centre, that means to contribute one‘s best resources and capabilities to alliances and partnerships and this applies to Germany more than it does to others, and Germany is ready to lead”, in her speech at the 51st Munich Security Conference, February 2015.[8]

In such a strategic environment, there are being questions raised regarding the security and defence for NATO’s and the EU’s member-states. Which strategies and military operational capabilities have taken place in order to confront the future security landscape? How far are possible hybrid threats recognized at the state level and which strategies and concepts of prevention exist? Should NATO and the EU cooperate for conducting a common Summit that will lead in the developing of a new strategy’s framework for security, defence and military cooperation, namely the “NATO’s – EU’s Strategic Defence and Security Review”?

  1. 1.    NATO: Challenge and Response to Hybrid Warfare

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has defined hybrid threat and has developed the strategy and doctrine regarding countering the hybrid threats by the NATO Military Working Group (Strategic Planning & Concepts), since February 2010.[9] In the same period, the term “hybrid” is mentioned in the 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review, in the 2010 US Joint Operating Environment, and in the 2009 US Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.[10]

            NATO has identified the Russian threat of hybrid warfare as particular dangerous because such an approach operates in gray area that exploits seams in the Alliance.[11]  Russia’s military strategy and its new military doctrine present a wider threat to the preservation of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. These have reshaped the Euro-Atlantic security environment and are a source of continued unforeseen situations, regional uncertainty, interests in the Arctic, which induced a contingent threat to NATO’s member-states[12]. Also, Russia’s political and military influence in the so called ‘Near Abroad’, as well as and the restoration its status as equal superpower remain the dominant aim of its political leadership and these are considered as a basic requirement for achieving its major goal of creating a balancing power to the western dominated international order.[13] These above crucial evolutions underline the requirement to re-define and bolster NATO’s collective defence strategy and military capabilities.

Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine demonstrated the new capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. Modernization of the Russian armed forces, begun in 2008 and continued in 2015. Compared to their performance in the 2008 conflict in Georgia, Russian forces in Crimea benefited from improvements in personnel equipment, logistics, personnel discipline electronic warfare capability and junior command training. The military capabilities, tactics, escalation control and integration of state instruments of power with information-warfare tools, that the Ukrainian crisis and Crimea operations demonstrated, were linked with the new nature of war that has been  described by Chief of the General Staff, Valeriy Gerasimov, as “non-linear”, “hybrid” or “ambiguous” warfare.[14]

On the other hand, the 2010 NATO’s Strategic Concept failed to explicitly mention a potential threat from Russia and referred to Moscow only as possible “Partner” for cooperation, therefore, was negligent. In aftermath of Ukraine and Crimea, collective defense should be the Alliance principal, overriding task.[15]

Obviously, this Russia’s aggressiveness has strengthened solidarity within NATO as military alliance: perception of its collective defence commitment has increased, underlining that today only the borders in Europe guaranteed by NATO are safe.[16]

The challenge for NATO was to react adequately and at the same time to avoid returning to Cold War thinking[17]. Taking into account the diversity of Alliance members and the dramatic developments in Ukraine and the Middle East/North Africa, NATO’s members demonstrated remarkable solidarity at the Wales Summit, agreeing on a number of important deliverables.

One of them is the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which is intended to ensure that the North Atlantic Alliance has the right military forces and the right equipment, in the right place and at the right time. In addition, the formation of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)/4,000-6,000 troops and the more than 40 military exercises conducted in Eastern Europe in 2014, demonstrate that NATO nations are sending a clear message not to Allies and Partners in the region, but mainly to Russia Federation.[18] While the development of the NATO’s VJTF is an important initiative, strengthening military forces on NATO’s periphery, however it is estimated that the forward-positioning of US or European military forces (European Army) may be more important to deterring future aggression. Conflicts in Georgia, Eastern Ukraine and Crimea demonstrated that Russia was able to act more quickly than international organization could react.[19] Therefore, it is demonstrable the delayed reaction by NATO against Crimea’s annexation by Russia and hybrid warfare in Ukraine, under the term of “solidarity”, that has been expressed later by the Readiness Action Plan (RAP)/2014, Political Guidance (PG15)/2015, ΝΑΤΟ Defence Planning Process (NDPP)/2015-18, which define the necessity to be more efficient and more effective their military strategy in order to meet today’s security challenges and promote the NATO’s and EU’s own values and interests.

NATO deterrence policy for hybrid warfare is based on a rapid military response. However, it is estimated that it has three potential weaknesses. Firstly, it is difficult for all member states to agree on the source of a conflict, creating a problem when they have to vote for a collective action. Secondly, fighting alone is insufficient to counter irregular threats. Although it will be a rapid response, deploying military force to a hybrid warfare area will turn out as “too little too late”. Finally, a deterrent built upon military force alone will not be credible. NATO cannot use the strategy of massive retaliation, or rely exclusively on one course of action, fighting against irregular threats.[20]

In parallel, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has sent a strong message stressing: “We need to keep NATO strong, we need to help keep our neighborhood stable in cooperation with our partners, and we need a rock-solid bond between the United States and Europe”.[21]

NATO needs a revised strategy supported by a more robust posture.  Russia’s hybrid warfare cannot be answered by a military alliance alone. NATO can make an effort to have the right forces available, to overcome its political disagreements and enhance the comprehensive approach with other international organizations such as the EU and the OSCE also in confronting hybrid threats.[22]

Moreover, it is not surprising that NATO’s 28 member states have their own perception for the risk and the geopolitical realities, and of course each Member State is expressed in a different way. And even in those areas where there is broad agreement about the nature or character of a threat, this does not necessarily translate into policy agreement regarding what must be done to address it. Operations in Afghanistan demonstrated that each country has its own explanation and appetite for risk, which is revealed in the form of different caveats, or national restrictions on the use of its forces in-theatre. The existence of member states with lack of public opinion for intervention in any security challenge beyond the borders of members, is leading in many cases to unwillingness on behalf of leaders to argue for such a role or to insist on one.[23]

Today, not only the northeast NATO–EU’s member states face Russian hybrid threats but also the south- southeast states face migrations and huge refugees flow and consequently these different threats are leading in different threat perception arising policy’s voices for a conducting a EU Summit, that is accomplished.[24] Also, we are conceptualizing the lack of political will to act.

Therefore, it is necessary for NATO to investigate and approach the issue of threats and especially the hybrid threats through a deeper holistic strategic partnership, particularly with the EU.

1.1       EU: Challenge and Response to Hybrid Warfare

On the other hand, European Union has global interests, values of global relevance and objectives that reflect these; however, a prioritization of interests, values and objectives is necessary. Europe has no other choice than to play its full role as a security actor.[25]

European Council 2013 regarding the effectiveness of the ESDP, the concrete progress with regard to the strengthening of EU Battle Groups is limited to the proposal that the “Athena” mechanism should cover the strategic transport of Battle Groups into theatres of operations. It is known, that the EU has had fully operational Battle Groups since 2007, – a multinational rapid reaction force. However, as it presently stands, the Battle Groups have never been deployed even though there have been plenty of opportunities to do so ranging from Mali and the Central African Republic, to Syria, and most recently Ukraine.[26]

Adjustments have been made in the broader EU Rapid Response concept published at the end of 2014, reviewing possibilities for the increased effectiveness of the deployment of land, air and sea components in case of crisis. Cooperation with NATO was enhanced by the initiation of staff talks and will continue to seek to identify possible synergies between the two organizations in the field of rapid response, with a focus on best practices and criteria for certification and standardization.[27]

The European response to the Ukraine crisis could be viewed as slow and responses within the ESDP framework as inadequate or ineffective. The Ukraine crisis and the Hybrid Warfare should be regarded not as a sudden European failure, but rather as a wake-up call for a necessity to start at last a strategic debate on EU security, defence and common strategic engagement.

Retrospectively on time, in 1998, during the St. Malo Summit, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, pointed out the original purpose of CSDP (then ESDP) which was that ‘The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so’.

However, sixteen years later, in November 2014, Federica Mogherini demonstrated an ambition in order to increase the EU’s global power by advancing EU-NATO cooperation, applying instruments of the Lisbon Treaty and by redesigning the European Security Strategy. Similarly, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Commission, announced plans about the creation of an “EU Army” in early March 2015[28] that would allow the EU to better defend its values and borders, better coordinate foreign and security policies, and send a clear message to Russia about Europe’s seriousness and global responsibilities.[29]

Moreover, it has also been known that EU agonizes by different team of political thoughts with significant differences between the “Atlanticists” (states favouring reliance on NATO and the US) and the “Gaullists” or “Europeanists” (states favouring greater EU defence autonomy).  Also, there is a French aspect, arguing, while “collective defence” draws on capabilities governed by sovereign nations, that “common defence” would need supranational-level governance, which is not yet provided, and the EU’s 21st century challenge will be to strike the right balance between both approaches. Lastly, the British referendum in 2017 is a crucial factor that is complicating the matters.

However, a “European Army” is more of a symbol of increased integrated military capabilities and a defence industry shared by 28 nations that cannot afford to develop new technologies and provide man-power for fulfilling the full spectrum of crisis management tasks on their own.[30] The majority of nations are sharing the two organizations, which have a feature set, and thus the EU needs NATO and the current Ukrainian crisis has deepened such a need for the effective treatment of Hybrid Russian threats.[31]

In a such political environment, a recent report ‘More Union in European Defence’ stresses the EU should aim to have the military capacity to support NATO and Nordic, Baltic and Central and Eastern European countries in deterring and countering conventional and hybrid warfare tactics.[32]

Therefore, EU in order to reach combat military capabilities and the ability to intervene in its strategic neighborhood when is required, should meet two general objectives: military capacity to support NATO in deterring and countering conventional and hybrid warfare tactics and also, within its political and military autonomy to conduct intervention and crisis management operations in order to respond to or deter international crises.[33]

1.2       Is there a chance for NATO and the EU to formulate a common “NATO’s – EU’s Strategic Defence and Security Review”?

            As it has been mentioned by the speakers in this hall, NATO and the EU member states face a distinct spectrum of security threats around the perimeter of the geographical area of the European continent, chiefly Russian hybrid threats its northeastern perimeter but also its inland.

It is known that NATO’s military forces constantly were transformed and were upgraded through Summits’ decisions in order to implement the fundamental principle of “collective defence”[34] while the current military forces of the European Union remain attached in confronting situations “crisis management”.[35]

In this context, NATO and the EU’s leaders made statements that these two organizations should strengthen their military cooperation and mainly be able to confront the emergence Russian Federation’s hybrid threats.[36] NATO Summit in Wales has already acknowledged the EU as a strategic partner of the Alliance whereas the common threat of hybrid warfare within the Euro-Atlantic area presents a solid opportunity to develop this partnership.[37]

These developments underscore the need to re-emphasize and strengthen collective defence efforts. For NATO, better coordination of the international efforts of member states, as well as those of international organizations, like the EU, might improve speed of action while magnifying the Alliance voice, but in many Western countries these capacities have been reduced since the Cold War; and rebuilding and updating them will take time and political commitments.[38]

NATO by partnering with the European Union and expanding its set of instruments would be in a much better situation to successfully tackle hybrid threats from all necessary angles with a wide range of both political and military instruments at its disposal. “Today, we do not have the luxury to choose between collective defence and crisis management. For the first time in NATO’s history we have to do both at the same time”, [39] pointed out NATO’s General Secretary.

However, an EU’s complementary partnership with NATO requires military forces to have increased mobility and flexibility, lethality, precision engagement, conduct joint operation and acquisition superior information by power position on the battlefield[40]. Furthermore, it requires power projection at coastal areas by naval forces with powerful air support elements. Corbett has again become more topical than ever, because of this post-Cold War change of planning for littoral warfare and power projection via the sea.[41] This was particularly visible in the Black Sea area, after the military intervention of Crimea by Russian military forces in March 2014, which had as a result the deactivation of the naval «Black Sea Force». Also, air forces are capable to ensure rapid reaction engagement, to project offensive strategy and provide operational strike capabilities, and sufficient transport support.[42]

Preserving the post-Cold War system in Europe should be the aim of Western Strategy. This has now come to mean breaking with our self-centered EU and NATO enlargement and establishing the priority of deterring Russia’s attempt to revise that order. The basic component of this strategy should be the dissuasion of Russia adventurism on NATO and EU territory, active support of the sovereignty of other European states and demonstrable readiness to deal with Russia.[43]

It is estimated that the above issues may be discussed in a new planning and cooperation framework, which can come from a joint Summit between NATO and the EU, and a very optimistic aspect is that NATO Summit 2016 in Warsaw can be transformed “mutatis muntadis”[44]  to a joint NATO-EU Summit 2016. A positive dynamic evolution of these events will give the possibility to plan the joint NATO-EU Strategic Defence and Security Review 2020. Of course, it is known, that Cyprus cannot participate.[45] But a future Cyprus’ participation in NATO’s PfP program will solve the problem and indeed there are states which would react on the conduct of such joint Summit.

A NATO’s – EU’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is needed to address the demands of the post-Ukraine crisis, Russian hybrid warfare and the future security environment, as well as to remedy the failings in implementing previous strategies. A reassessment of NATO-EU strategic partnership and its implementation is timely and necessary. It is considered there are five imperatives which are reflected to the transforming strategic framework for such a review, as following:

•          Joint NATO-EU Security and Defence Review 2020.

•          Defence and Engagement for the confrontation of hybrid threats.

•          International fundamentalist jihadist terrorism and the ongoing migration flows.

•          Energy Security.

•          Evolving nature of conflicts and technology developments.

NATO’s-EU’s Strategic Defence and Security Review 2020 could include and specify the following pillars:

  • NATO-EU Security and Defence Policy.
  • Military Transformation and Structure of the Armed Forces.
  • Joint System C4ISTAR.
  • Joint Logistics Policy.
  • Policy and Strategy on Human Resources (e.g.: Education – Military Training).
  • Policy on defense budgets, supplies/procurement, armament programs and defence industries.

The above strategy will be the continuation of the «Comprehensive Approach»[46] that already has been adopted by NATO and the European Union, and mainly will accelerate the procedures for the creation of European Army.[47]

1.3       Epilogue

To sum up, the Ukraine crisis highlighted that the EU and NATO had not been expecting, nor were prepared, to meet the challenges of hybrid warfare.

As NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said he and Mogherini had agreed to “intensify NATO-EU cooperation in countering hybrid warfare”[48], and it is estimated that a common NATO – EU Summit, as continuation of NATO Wales Summit 2014, is needed. This NATO’s-EU΄s Strategic Defence and Security Review will be more than a document, which will provide a shared vision for the 34 nations[49] about the NATO-EU’s global role, interests, and responsibilities.

The Review will identify the important areas of defence and security policy that must be addressed in light of the changing character of twenty-first century warfare, especially in the face of hybrid warfare, the military utility and its capabilities, and reduced by NATO’s – EU’s governments military spending. This Review will coordinate NATO’s and EU’s security and defence commitments in order to defend the status quo and confront the hybrid threats in a changing multipolar world which is characterized by “stable instability”[50].

Ladies and Gentleman,

Personally, I believe that Romania has the ability and can take the initiatives to coordinate member states for the planning of such strategy. However, the opportunism of member states should be eliminated, both in political and possibly in military level, which will dissent this strategy.

Finally, paraphrasing John F. Kennedy’ historical phrase, it is emphasized “Do not wonder what NATO or the EU is doing for our countries, but what we are doing to strengthen NATO and the EU.”

Thank you very much for you undivided attention.


Maj. Gen (ret) Polychronis Nalmpantis graduated from the Hellenic Military Academy in 1982 and War College in 2002. As a Hellenic Army officer, he was Commander in several Units (Hellenic Armor School, Tank Battalion and Reconnaissance Tank Battalion). Also, he served as Director of National Defence Policy Division and as Deputy Director of Strategic Studies Division at the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence (HMoND) /Defense Minister’s Staff, played a pivotal role at the planning of the HMoND’s Strategic Defence Review (2001) and National Defence Policy (2005) / Greece’s Strategic Doctrine. He holds a degree in Political Science and International Studies of Panteion University/Athens, Master of Philosophy (MPhil) of King’s College / London University, and postgraduate diplomas of the Centre d ‘Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques Paris and the University of Aberdeen. Also, he has certificate from the “Black Sea Security Program” of John F. Kennedy School of Government/Harvard University.

He edited Sir Lawrence Freedman’s book “WAR” in greek language by the Editor “Hellinika Grammata” (2001), and Azar Gat’s book “The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteen Century” by the Editor  “Hellenic National Defence General Staff” (2015).

This period, he is Lecture at Institute of International Relation of Panteion University, and he also is PhD candidate at the Department of International and European Studies of Panteion University, Athens.


[1] Chris Brown, Terry, Nicholas Rengger, International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War , Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.52

[2]   Michael Fallon, UK Secretary of State for Defence, Speech to RUSI on the SDSR 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretarys-speech-to-rusi-on-the-sdsr-2015,see also the US Quadrennial Defence Review, US Joint Vision 2010, US Joint Vision 2020, 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review and also  About SDSR 2015 https://www.rusi.org/SDSR2015/About/#.VgWSccvtmko

[3] Alexander Vershbow, NATO Deputy Secretary General, Speech at the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, Riga, Latvia, 5 March 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117919.htm?selectedLocale=en[4] Military Balance, Comperative Defence statistics/Chapter 2 & Europe/Chapter 4, IISS, Routledge Taylor &Francis Group, London 2015, p. 21-64[5] Complex crisis call for adaptable and durable capabilities, The Military Balance 2015, IISS, Edt. Routledge Tailor &Francis Group, London, Feb 2015, p.5, p.21-22[6] Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee, Eva Maas, Defence matters: more urgent than ever, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael Report, April 2015, p. 7 [7] Javier Solana, Steven Blockmans, Giovanni Faleg, More Union in European Defence, Report of a CEPS TASK FORCE, Centre for European Policy, 2015, p.9-10[8] Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, Federal Minister of Defense, Speech on the Occasion of the 51st Munich Security Conference, Munich,  6th  February 2015, p.2-6[9] Javier Solana, Steven Blockmans, Giovanni Faleg, More Union in European Defence, Report of a CEPS TASK FORCE, Centre for European Policy, 2015, p.15[10] ibid, p.19[11] Hybrid Warfare: Challenge and response, The Military Balance 2015, IISS, Edt. Routledge Tailor &Francis Group, London, Feb 2015, p.17[12] Olga Oliker, Russia’s New Military Doctrine: Same as the Old Doctrine, Mostly, http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/01/russias-new-military-doctrine-same-as-the-old-doctrine.html,see also http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/policy/2015/01/10/russia-military-doctrine-ukraine-putin/21441759/ and  http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf [13] Roderic Lyne, “Russia’s Changed Outlook on the West: From Convergence to Confrontation”   in  The Russian Challenge, Chatham House Report, June 2015, p.2, p.10-12 https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150605RussianChallengeGilesHansonLyneNixeySherrWood.pdf?dm_i=1TY5,3F7BE,B3XOTD,C8U3N,1[14] Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance 2015, IISS, Edt. Routledge Tailor &Francis Group, London, Feb 2015, p.158[15] Matthew Kroening, Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War, Survival February –March 2015, IISS, Taylor &Francis, London, 2015, p.57[16] Ibid, p. 10[17] Ibid, p. 11[18] Ibid, p. 11[19] Military Balance 2015, Hybrid warfare: challenge and response, IISS, Edts Routledge Taylor &Francis Group, London, p.19[20] Daniel Ştefănescu, NATO Strategy to Defeat Enemy Forces in Hybrid Warfare,  International Conference of Scientific Paper, AFASES 2015, Brasov, 28-30 May 2015[21] Ibid, p.12[22] Ibid, p11[23] Xenia Wickett and Kathleen J. McInnis, NATO: Charting the Way Forward, Research Paper, US Project | July 2014, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, p.21

[24] Migrant crisis: EU to boost aid to agencies, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34344346

[25] Ibid, p. 12[26] Ibid, p.23[27] Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee, Eva Maas, Defence matters: more urgent than ever, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael Report, April 2015, p. 17[28] Rihards Bambals,     “European Security, Defence, and Global Role: A Year After Crimea”, in War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe, Eds Artis Pabriks, Andis Kudors,  The Centre for East European Policy Studies,  University of Latvia Press, Rīga, 2015,p.14[29] Ibid, p.23[30] Ibid, p.23-25[31] Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee, Eva Maas, Defence matters: more urgent than ever, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael Report, April 2015, p.22[32] More Union in European Defence. Report of a CEPS Task Force, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, February 2015, p. 11.[33] Javier Solana, Steven Blockmans, Giovanni Faleg, More Union in European Defence, Report of a CEPS TASK FORCE, Centre for European Policy, 2015, p.11

[34] Collective Defence, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm

[35] Europe, The Military Balance 2015, IISS, Edt. Routledge Tailor &Francis Group, London, Feb 2015, p.59[36]  Alexander Vershbow, NATO Deputy Secretary General, Speech at the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, Riga, Latvia, 5 March 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117919.htm?selectedLocale=en

[37] NATO Foreign Ministers discuss boosting cooperation with EU, other partners, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_119421.htm?selectedLocale=en

[38] Hybrid Warfare: Challenge and response, The Military Balance 2015, IISS, Edt. Routledge Tailor &Francis Group, London, Feb 2015, p.18[39] Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, Keynote Speech at the opening of the NATO TransformationSeminar, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_118435.htm?selectedLocale=en[40] Polychronis Nalmpantis, Maj. Gen (ret), Speech “A Critical Evaluation of Helenic Strategic Defence Review, 2001 / Κριτική Αξιολόγηση Αμυντικής Στρατηγικής Αξιολόγησης 2001”, Hellenic National Defence General Staff & Institute of International Relation /Pateion University, Common Conference, June 27-28, 2015, Athens, http://www.acastran.org/, see also “Hellenic Armed Forces and Joint Vision 2020” in http://www.geetha.mil.gr/el/briefing-el/other-info-el/art-vima-greek-strategy-el.htmlhttp://www.geetha.mil.gr/el (Βήμα Ελληνικής Στρατηγικής Σκέψης/Εργασίες-Διατριβές-Ομιλίες)[41] Ibid.[42] Polychronis Nalmpantis, Maj. Gen (ret), Speech “Common Strategy for Black Sea 2030” National Intelligence Academy & Harvard University School Conference, June 2-7 2014 Bucharest[43] Francois Heisbourg, Preserving Post-Cold War Europe, Survival February –March 2015, IISS, Taylor &Francis, London, 2015, p.40[44] mutatis mutandis:  usually used when describing similarities between two cases to make allowances for the obvious differences between them, or “the necessary changes having been made” or “once the necessary changes have been made”. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mutatis_mutandis, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutatis_mutandis

[45]NATO-EU: a strategic partnership, Other areas of Cooperation-New areas of cooperation http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm?selectedLocale=en

[46] A ”comprehensive approach” to crises, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51633.htm

[47] Ralph D. Thiele, Crisis in Ukraine – The Emergence of Hybrid Warfare,Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW, Issue  No. 347, May 2015, p.8-10[48] Adrian Croft and Sabine Siebold, NATO and the EU work together to counter Crimea style “Hybrid” warfare, www.reuters.com/articles/2015/05/14/us-nato-ministers[49]http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm,


[50] Polychronis Nalmpantis, Maj. Gen (ret), Speech “Common Strategy for Black Sea 2030” National Intelligence Academy & Harvard University School Conference, June 2-7 2014 Bucharest