

SECURITY DILEMMAS IN EURASIA

The cold war was distinguished by a linear division between East and West and by the presence of a clear and distinct threat against Western interests. The Soviet Union and its geopolitical allies were threatening western interests in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The Soviet threat and the American reaction created a bipolar world - two superpowers locked in a head-on confrontation, with many of the other countries adhering to the coalitions created by the two superpowers. In such an environment, the foreign policy doctrine elaborated by the American leadership was the «containment doctrine» namely the attempt to contain the Soviet Union and restrict its expansion in the hope that the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet system would lead, sooner or later, to its collapse. In this framework, the U.S. created a network of multilateral or bilateral alliances (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS) that successfully lined up against the Soviet coalition. The U.S. also created an international economic system through a series of agreements, aid programs for their allies, and economic organizations, such as the Bretton Woods conference, the Marshall Plan and OECD respectively, the establishment of which contributed to the reinforcement of the western coalition, and finally, to the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹

Today things are different. We are facing a more complex international system which, unlike the linear and inflexible bipolar system, is fluid and unpredictable. The threats to this new international system are not clear and one-dimensional, but are diffused to many poles, are expressed at different levels and have different levels of intensity. There is no longer a large and obvious threat, similar to that of the Soviet Union against the western community. On the contrary, there are multiple, low-intensity threats and the consensus for dealing with them is much more difficult to achieve among the western allies. The security and defense issues that concern the western community have risen sharply. Military power is now only one of the factors of national power, while competition among the great powers has moved from the military to the economic field. Today, economic issues, energy, trade and technology issues claim priority in the design of the post-cold -war western strategy.²

¹ Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

² Robert S. Borosage, «Inventing the Threat», *World Policy Journal* 10, no.4 (Winter 1993-94), p.9.

Another factor that further complicates post cold war security concerns the new form of the international system. The international system is evolving, as shown by the dramatic changes in actors, actions, and the distribution of power. The result of these changes is even more indistinct and uncertain. Will they lead to policies of balance of forces after a redistribution of power among the great powers (Germany, China, Japan, USA, Russia)? Will the present situation develop into a new competition between West and East? Or, on the contrary, will there be a continuous and peaceful understanding among the great powers?

The remarkably stable and predictable atmosphere of the cold war is gone and the question is whether we are turning back to a multipolar system, stable but all too war prone. In many ways, however, as Waltz has argued, bipolarity endures but in an altered form.³ «Bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can still take care of itself and because no other great powers have yet emerged. Russia's ability to play a military role beyond its borders has diminished, yet nuclear weapons ensure that no state can challenge it.»⁴ Nuclear weapons alone, however, do not turn states into great powers. Russia will not remain a great power unless it is able to use its resources effectively in the long run. Its nuclear capability only enables her to turn resources from the military sector of her economy to civilian ones. While it is trying to do so, its large population, vast resources, and geographic presence in Europe and Asia compensate for its many weaknesses. «Short of disintegration, Russia will remain a great power-indeed a great defensive power, as the Russian and Soviet states were through most of their history.»⁵

Some of the implications of bipolarity, however, have changed. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union held each other in check. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States is no longer held in check by any other country or combination of countries.⁶ For many analysts America's global primacy, in the aftermath of the cold war, will be directly dependent upon its ability

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, «The Emerging Structure of International Politics» *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79.

⁴ Ibid, p. 52.

⁵ Ibid, p. 52.

⁶ Waltz argues that if we understand balance of power to be a recurring phenomenon rather than a particular and ephemeral condition we can predict that other countries, alone or in concert, will try to bring American power into balance. All the more so because a country wielding overwhelming power can not be expected to behave with moderation for long. Ibid.

to perpetuate its preponderance on the Eurasian continent, which was, after all, the geopolitical prize of the victory of the cold war.⁷

Eurasia, the globe's largest continent, is geopolitically important. According to Brzezinski, «for half a millennium, world affairs were dominated by Eurasian powers and peoples who fought with one another for regional domination and reached out for global power. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world's three most advanced and economically productive regions. About 75% of the world's people live in Eurasia and most of the world's physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about 60% of the world's GNP and about three fourths of the world's known energy resources. All but one of the world's overt nuclear powers and all but one of the covert ones are located in Eurasia.»⁸

The thesis of this essay is that Eurasia has been the main theater of Soviet-American rivalry throughout the cold war and will remain the bone of contention in the post cold war era.⁹ This essay adopts a geopolitical way of looking at international relations, as a framework which, without predetermining policy choice, suggests long term factors and trends in security objectives of particular territorially organized security communities. Geopolitics refer to «the relation of international political power to the geographical setting.»¹⁰ The geopolitical perspective allows us to discern trends, and even patterns, in power relations. Geopolitics was fashionable in the 1930s and 1940s but declined in popularity due to its association with German Geopolitik and changes in military and civil technology.¹¹ The concepts contained in the classic literature of geopolitics remain relevant today despite the fact that the classic writings need to be reinterpreted in view of the changed meaning that technology gives to geography.¹²

Sir Halford Mackinder introduced the discussion of Eurasia with his concepts of the Eurasian pivot area (which included much of Siberia and Central Asia) and later of

⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), p. 30.

⁸ Ibid, p. 31.

⁹ Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*, (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1977).

¹⁰ Saul B. Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a Divided World*, (London: Methuen, 1964), p.24.

¹¹ Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*, p. 11; Colin S. Gray, «Across the Nuclear Divide: Strategic Studies, Past and Present.» *International Security*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Summer 1977).

¹² Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*, p. 12.

the Central - East European «heartland» (which was equivalent to the territory of the former Soviet Union) as the vital springboards for world domination.¹³

In this context he coined his famous dictum:¹⁴

*Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World- Island commands the World.*

As Colin S. Gray has pointed out Mackinder was wrong. «In 1941-43, Nazi Germany not only ruled East Europe, its armies stood on the banks of Volga at the gateway to Asia-and yet the Heartland power recovered and secured total victory.»¹⁵

An American political scientist, Nicholas Spykman, offered a critique of Mackinder's thesis about the opposition between British sea power and Russian land power reminding us that World Wars I and II were not simple land power-sea power struggles. Instead, he offered his counterdictum:¹⁶

Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world

His thesis did not fundamentally challenge Spykman's thesis on the importance of Eurasia and the need for the maintenance of balance of power in that region. Their difference lied only in the relative importance of the Eurasian Rimlands vs the Eurasian Heartland. To prevent the domination of Eurasia by a single power the United States entered two World Wars in a century.

Today, Brzezinski argues, Geopolitics has moved from the regional to the global dimension, «with preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent serving as the central basis for global primacy. The United States, a non-Eurasian power, now enjoys international supremacy, with its power directly deployed on three peripheries

¹³ Mackinder's most important geopolitical writings are collected in the volume *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Norton, 1962).

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 150.

¹⁵ Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*, p. 25.

¹⁶ Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), p.43.

of the Eurasian continent, from which it exercises a powerful influence on the states occupying the Eurasian hinterland.»¹⁷

The middle space of Eurasia controlled in the past by the former Soviet Union is now the most fragmented and fluid section of Eurasia. To the south of this region lies the energy rich section of Eurasia of vital interest and importance to the great powers.

The far eastern section of Eurasia is occupied by an increasingly powerful China whose enormous population, rapid economic growth, continuous increase of military power and the promotion of its geopolitical interests in the South China Sea make her a formidable player.

The purpose of this essay is to identify the hot spots in Eurasia, where a shift in the distribution of power might bring about a shift in the international distribution of power; and to identify the American strategy in Eurasia in the aftermath of the Cold War.

The Actors

In the geopolitical game for control of Eurasia Brzezinski identifies two kinds of states: active geostrategic players and geopolitical pivots. Active geostrategic players are defined as «the states that have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter the existing geopolitical state of affairs.»¹⁸ Geopolitical pivots are the states «whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potential vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players. Most often, geopolitical pivots are determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player. In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region.»¹⁹ The identification and protection/promotion of the post-Cold War key Eurasian geopolitical pivots has become a crucial aspect of America's geostrategy.²⁰ In the current global circumstances, we can identify five major geostrategic players in Eurasia. The United

¹⁷ Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p. 39.

¹⁸ Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p. 40.

¹⁹ Ibid, p.41.

²⁰ For a discussion of states, pivotal to the promotion of U.S. interests see, Paul Kennedy, Emily Hill, Robert Chase, «The Pivotal States» *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no 1, (January-February 1996).

States, France, Germany, Russia, China. Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran play the role of the geopolitical pivots.²¹

The case of Western Europe remains. The achievement of unity would produce an instant great power, but Europe is far from a final decision to form a single, effective political entity with common foreign and defense policies. Despite difficulties two factors may enable W. Europe to achieve political unity. «The first is Germany the second the U.S. Uneasiness over the political and economic clout of Germany, intensified by the possibility of its becoming a nuclear power may produce the final push to unification. The Europeans also doubt their ability to compete on even terms with the U.S. unless they are able to act as a political as well as an economic unit. If the EU fails to become a single entity, the emerging world will nevertheless be one of four or five great powers, whether the European one is called Germany or the U.S. of Europe.»²²

In any case, France and Germany are the most important players in the western section of Eurasia. Both countries have their own vision of a unified Europe but a different view of their relationship with the United States. France in particular, «has its own geostrategic concept of Europe, one that differs in some significant respects from that one of the U.S., and is inclined to engage in tactical maneuvers designed to play off Russia against America and Great Britain against Germany, even while relying on the Franco-German alliance to offset its own relative weakness.»²³

Moreover, both France and Germany have the power and the will to exercise a wider regional influence. France not only seeks a central role in a unifying Europe but also sees itself as the nucleus of a Mediterranean-North African cluster of states that share common concerns. Germany has recently shown an inclination to play a more prominent role in the world. Germany is increasingly conscious of its status as Europe's leading state in both economic and conventional military power although for some years the eastern part of Germany will be a drain on its economy.²⁴ Moreover, both France and Germany maintain a special relationship with Russia. Some analysts

²¹ Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, pp. 40-41.

²² Kenneth Waltz, «The Emerging Structure of International Politics», p.70.

²³ Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p.42.

²⁴ Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p. 62.

even fear that Germany even retains, «the grand option of a special bilateral accommodation with Russia.»²⁵

Great Britain, on the other hand, does not fit Brzezinski's definition of a geostrategic player. «It has fewer major options, it entertains no ambitious vision of Europe's future, and its relative decline has also reduced its capacity to play the traditional role of the European balancer. Its ambivalence regarding European unification and its attachment to a waning special relationship with America have made Great Britain increasingly irrelevant insofar as the major choices confronting Europe's future are concerned. London has largely dealt itself out of the European game.»²⁶

Russia remains a major geostrategic player, despite its current weakness. Currently, Russia is unable to project power beyond its borders but its very presence has a decisive impact on the choices of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. If Russia manages to avoid disintegration and recovers its strength it will exert a considerable amount of influence upon its western and eastern neighbors. More importantly, however, the future of events in Eurasia will depend upon Russia's relationship with the United States: will it be a cooperative or an antagonistic relation? According to Brzezinski, «much depends on how its internal politics evolve especially on whether Russia becomes a European democracy or a Eurasian empire again. In any case, it clearly remains a player, even though it has lost some of its «pieces» as well as some key spaces on the Eurasian chessboard.»²⁷ (for a discussion of Russia see the chapter «Russia and Realism» by Paul Marantz).

The other medium-sized European states by virtue of being members of NATO or the EU, either follow America's lead or that of France or Germany. Their policies do not have a wider impact and they are not in a position to alter their basic alignments. At this stage they are neither geostrategic players nor geopolitical pivots.

U.S. policy towards Eurasia is complicated. For the United States Eurasia is the trophy of the Cold War victory. America's global primacy, according to its leading geopolitician, will be directly dependent on how effectively it preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained.²⁸ Both pillars of America's Eurasian strategy, however, the European and the Asian, face critical dilemmas. The European pillar of

²⁵ Ibid, p. 42.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 42.

²⁷ Ibid. p 44.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 30.

America's Eurasian strategy has been largely implemented via NATO. NATO has provided the vehicle for American military presence in Europe and American influence on European matters. In the post Cold War era America will have to assess its long-term strategy towards Europe explicitly addressing «issues of European unity and real partnership with Europe. A real choice in favor of a united Europe will thus compel a far-reaching reordering of NATO, inevitably reducing the American primacy within the alliance.»²⁹ America's strategy will also have to address the issue of Europe's and NATO's geographic scope. «How far eastward should the European Union extend? And should the limits of the EU be synonymous with the eastern front line of NATO? The former is more a matter of a European decision, but a European decision on that issue will have direct implications for a NATO decision.»³⁰

These decisions affect not only Europe's future but relations with Russia as well, thus, linking the European and the Asian pillars of America's Eurasian strategy.

The Asian pillar of America's Eurasian strategy is ingrained with dilemmas regarding the future of Russia. Soviet Union's disintegration resulted in a geopolitical vacuum in eastern-central Europe the Balkans and Central Asia. American governments have not resisted the temptation to fill this vacuum and consolidate the gains from the victory of the Cold War. American actions in Europe (NATO's enlargement) and Central Asia (penetration in the energy- rich region) may ultimately, however, undermine the democratic and reformist forces in Russia because they operate on the underlying assumption that Russia that is inherently undemocratic and will always maintain ambitions for a Eurasian and global role, and result in policies of exclusion, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy in the Russian mindset.

A few words are warranted on states in Eurasia that have acquired the importance of geopolitical pivots. Brzezinski aptly summarizes Ukraine's importance, especially in relation to Russia. «Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state. If Moscow regains control of Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains its wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.»³¹

²⁹ Ibid, p. 50.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 50.

³¹ Ibid, p. 46.

Azerbaijan is a critical country because of its significant resources, which together with those of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will affect Russia's relations with the West and have an impact on its transformation.

Turkey and Iran are also pivotal states according to western analysts. According to Brzezinski, «Turkey stabilizes the Black Sea region, controls access from it to the Mediterranean Sea, balances Russia in the Caucasus, still offers an antidote to Muslim fundamentalism, and serves as the southern anchor for NATO. Iran dominates the eastern shoreline of the Persian Gulf, while its independence, irrespective of current Iranian hostility toward the United States, acts as a barrier to any long-term Russian threat to American interests in the Persian Gulf region.»³²

Brzezinski himself, however, confesses that the importance of those two states is limited and subject to change. «Both states confront serious domestic problems and their capacity for effecting major regional shifts in the distribution of power is limited. They are also rivals and thus tend to negate each other's influence.»³³

In fact, as he later claims, «another major uncertainty looms in the large and geopolitically fluid space of Central Eurasia, maximized by the potential vulnerability of the Turkish-Iranian pivots.»³⁴

In sum, whether these states are assets or liabilities for the West will depend upon developments in their domestic political scene, the nature of their political regime and their relation with the United States and the West.

The Regions

Eastern-Central Europe and the Balkans

The most volatile and vulnerable region of Eurasia is Eastern - Central Europe and the Balkans. Every country in this part of Europe has been overrun by war, conquered, occupied, liberated, and reoccupied. Every state has a different shape from the one it had in the beginning of the century. «Only six of the twenty-three states which now fill the map between Trieste and the Urals were in existence in the beginning of the century or would have been if they had not been occupied by some army: Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Turkey, for neither post-1918 Austria nor

³² Ibid, p. 47.

³³ Ibid, p. 47.

post-1918 Hungary is really comparable to Habsburg Hungary and Cisleithania. Several came into existence after World War I, others since 1989. They include several countries which had never in history had the status of independent statehood in the modern sense, or which had it briefly-for a year or two, for a decade or two-and then lost it though some have since regained it: the three little Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, Moldova, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, not to go further eastward. Some were born and died in my lifetime like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.»³⁵

In the realm of both politics and economics we are witnessing attempts by states in these regions to make a radical break with the past: «In fact, in both realms the word transitions best describes the process launched in a number of countries. These are transitions from authoritarianism of several varieties to democracy and from state-administered, monopolistic, and protected economic systems, again of several varieties, to a reliance on markets. Both transitions are radical, and they are interdependent.»³⁶

This rush towards parliamentary democracy and the extremes of free market capitalism in economics does not constitute a model or a pattern, but chiefly a reaction against what has gone before. The question is whether these countries, in the light of history since 1918, will succeed in joining the club of the really advanced countries. At present, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will go on living in countries disappointed in their past, probably largely disappointed with their present, and uncertain about their future. The movements and ideologies most likely to benefit from this mood are most likely to be movements inspired by xenophobic nationalism and intolerance. (For a discussion of some of these dangers see the chapter on «» by Marilena Koppa).

This uncertainty has led most of these countries to apply for membership to the European Union and NATO. Indeed, for an interim period, the continuation of NATO makes sense. Low intensity threats such as Bosnia, and Kosovo will sustain NATO's solidarity and make it a stabilizing force in a time of rapid change. We know from

³⁴ Ibid, p. 52.

³⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, «The New Threat to History», *The New York Review of Books*, December 16, 1993.

³⁶ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Markets*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). See also, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, *From Authoritarianism to Democracy: Concepts and Intellectual Trends*, in William Olson ed., *The theory and Practice of International Relations*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994).

balance of power theory as well as from history, however, that alliances are organized against a perceived threat. How can an alliance endure the absence of a worthy opponent? In the long run NATO will have, either to reinvent the obvious threat, Russia, or, in the absence of a shared perception of a severe threat, turn to a collective security organization. (for a discussion of European security architecture and NATO's future look at the chapters «The Problem of European Security» by Charalambos Papasotiriou and «The Enlargement of NATO: Shaping Europe in the Post-Cold War World» by Raimo Väyrynen).

Central Asia

One important geopolitical consequence of the demise of the Soviet Union was the rise of an intense political and commercial competition for control of the vast energy resources of the newly independent and vulnerable states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These energy resources and, in particular, the oil and natural gas deposits have now become the apple of discord in Central Asia introducing, according to analysts, a new chapter in the «Great Game» of control over Eurasia.³⁷

Although, the stakes involved remain the same, power-influence-security-wealth, the new playing field is further complicated by a vast array of problems. These include intra-regional conflict, political instability, fierce competition among multinational conglomerates, and a shortfall in commercial expertise and legal infrastructures.³⁸

Moreover, the fact that the three countries that share the majority of the region's energy resources, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, are landlocked makes them dependent on their immediate neighbors for access to the Western markets.

The essence of this «new geopolitical game» in Central Asia is twofold: first, control of production of the oil and gas, and second, control of the pipelines that will transfer the oil to the western markets.³⁹

³⁷ The phrase «Great Game» has been borrowed from Rudyard Kipling's description of the rivalry among Tsarist Russia, Victorian England and the Ottoman Empire in Central Asia for control of trade routes to India in the 19th century. See Fiona Hill, «Pipeline Politics, Russo-Turkish Competition and Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean» in *Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean*, Andreas Theophanous and Van Coufoudakis eds. (Cyprus: Intercollege Press, 1997) p:200.

³⁸ Rosemarie Forsythe, «The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia,» *Adelphi Paper*, no 300, (May 1996), p. 6.

³⁹ While the Central Asian states have physical possession of the oil and gas reserves, they do not possess the capital and the technology that would allow them to go in to production alone, which brings in the foreign companies with a share in production and revenues.

The outcome of this game will determine the future of the Central Asian region, will have an impact upon Russia's future and the relations between this country and the West.

Greece-Turkey

The transition from bipolarity to polycentrism, in the aftermath of the Cold War, has led to the intensification of the peripheral disputes. Such disputes, as the Greek-Turkish one, are now devoid of the most salient characteristics of bipolarity, like alliance cohesiveness and discipline, which in the past had a restraining effect on the actions of regional rivals. Reliance on alliances is diminishing and there is an increasing emphasis on regional balance of power systems, and self-reliance on defense which in turn necessitates the development of autonomous and coherent defense strategies.

In focusing on the Greek-Turkish we can articulate a set of interrelated assumptions: 1. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the War in the Gulf Turkey has emerged as a regional power due to its geopolitical position at the center of a triangle of instability (Middle East--Central Asia--Balkans). Indeed, Turkey has tried to capitalize on its prominent place in U.S. strategy in the aftermath of the Cold War, as a pivotal state in the regions of the Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia. A 1995 Pentagon report sums the official US attitude towards Turkey as follows: «Turkey in particular is now at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent including NATO, the Balkans, the Aegean, Iraq sanctions, relations with the NIS, peace in the Middle East, and transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas.»⁴⁰ (For a discussion of Turkey's new role see the chapter on Turkey and Israel by Marios Evryviades; for further discussion on the Middle East see the chapter by Sasson Sofer «Diplomacy of a Divided Society: The Case of Israel»).

2. The balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean is rapidly changing to Turkey's favor as demonstrated through four indicators of power: demography, economy, technology, and armaments. 3. There is a consensus among Greek elites and the Greek public regarding the existence of a Turkish threat. The Greek elite maintains that the Turkish threat does not take the form of an imminent all out war but consists of a well

⁴⁰ Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, (Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, 1995)p.25.

concerted strategy of intimidation manifested through a series of low level threats in a number of issue areas. These areas include the airspace of the Aegean, the continental shelf and the limits of the Greek territorial waters, as well as the manipulation of the Muslim minority of Thrace. (for a discussion of Greek-Turkish relations in a comparative framework see the chapter on «Factors of Stability and Instability in the Pacific and the Eastern Mediterranean» by Angelos Syrigos).Greece is trying to respond to the Turkish threat with a strategy of deterrence that seeks to persuade Turkey that the cost of using military force against Greece will outweigh the benefits. Greece's deterrence would not be credible if it did not include Cyprus since Greece has undertaken certain guarantees regarding Cyprus and also Greece' defensive doctrine states that renewed Turkish aggression in Cyprus would constitute a *casus belli* for Greece. Extended deterrence is not only based on denial but on retaliation at a theater and level of its choice. (For a discussion of Greece's response see the chapter «Greek Deterrence Strategy by Athanassios G. Platias).

4. The geopolitics of oil in Central Asia feed into the broader context of Greek-Turkish relations in the Balkans, the Aegean, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has lobbied aggressively for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as the major outlet for the Caspian Sea energy resources stressing the following strategic advantages: its proximity to the Caucasus and Central Asia, its existing pipeline network, a major refining center and port at Ceyhan and the political backing of the United States.⁴¹

In its effort to promote a stable and independent southern Caucasus and Central Asia the US administration has opted to strengthen Turkey while at the same time exploring an improvement in American-Iranian relations. Accordingly, America has used its influence in Europe to encourage Turkey's eventual admission to the EU and has made a point of treating Turkey as a European state, provided internal Turkish politics will not take a dramatic turn in the Islamic direction. The U.S. has also consulted regularly with Ankara regarding the future of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia in an effort to foster in Turkey a sense of strategic partnership with the U.S. America has also strongly supported Turkish aspirations to have a pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan as the major outlet for the Caspian Sea basin energy sources.⁴²

⁴¹ Fiona Hill, «Pipeline Politics, Russo-Turkish Competition and Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean» in *Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean*, Andreas Theophanous and Van Koufoudakis eds. (Cyprus: Intercollege Press, 1997) p. 220.

⁴² Brzezinski, pp. 203-204.

In order to fulfill these aspirations Turkey has tried to upstage the northern and the western routes that would bring the oil to Novorossisk (Russian port) and Supsa (Georgian port) and then ship it through the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Aegean to the Mediterranean and the West. Turkey, by virtue of its control of the straits is trying to pose problems to these options by insisting that the straits can not cope with increased tanker traffic. The obstacles raised by Turkey in the straits could be overcome by the Burgass-Alexandroupolis proposal (put forward by Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece) that would transfer the oil from the Black Sea to the Aegean bypassing the straits. Turkey, however, has tried to destabilize the area by challenging the legal status quo of the Aegean Sea through a series of aggressive acts that include the violation of Greece's national airspace, a threat of war in case Greece exercises its right to extend its territorial waters to 12 n. miles, and the dispute of Greece's sovereignty on Aegean islands.

Turkey and the U.S. have been alarmed by the purchase from the Cypriot government of a Russian made defensive anti-aircraft missile system (S-300) because they believe that a boiling crisis in and around Cyprus, which is strategically situated across the Turkish Ceyhan terminal, would enhance the already existing doubts about the security of the pipeline and peril its feasibility.

If developments in Central Asia and the selection of pipelines seems to feed the Greek-Turkish conflict with yet another element they might serve as a catalyst to the re-conceptualization of the relationship as a non zero sum game. If the selection of multiple pipelines prevails the U.S., Greece, and Turkey will share in this case a common interest. Their aim would be to ease tensions in the Aegean and Cyprus to accommodate the oil pipelines via Burgass-Alexandroupolis and the Aegean as well as via Turkey to Ceyhan. A flare up of hostilities would equally hurt their vital interests as well as hamper plans for american and european investments in the energy resources in the Transcaucasia region.

Concluding Remarks

What happens in Eurasia will depend, to a large extent, on America's strategy. America is the world's unchallenged superpower, the victor of the Cold War, and, as such, retains the initiative to develop policies that will shape the post-Cold War world, in general and security in Eurasia, in particular. No major Eurasian issue can be decided without America's participation or arbitration. How the U.S. relates to the

major powers of Eurasia will determine the longevity of its primacy and the nature of the balance of power system in the region.

The first signs of America's post Cold War strategy are increasingly evident and suggest an urgency to consolidate the spoils from the victory of the Cold War. In Europe there is support for the enlargement of European Union and NATO to include new Central European members that used to be in the Soviet sphere of influence. Support for a more politically united Europe, however, is limited. Russia, on the other hand, has been given a seat at the table but has not become a de facto decision making member of the alliance. Its participation is largely ceremonial and symbolic. In Central Asia, large scale international investment, actively supported by the U.S. government, aims at tapping the region's energy and mineral resources, consolidating the independence of these new countries, and extricating them from the Russian sphere of influence.

The future of the American strategy in Eurasia will depend, essentially, upon two factors: 1. the evolution of the Atlantic partnership in the post Cold War era. To put it differently, whether Europe will assert itself and become politically more unified and less dependent on the Atlantic framework for its defense, and
2. Russia's ability to recover its strength and become again a major actor in Eurasia.