

PANTEION UNIVERSITY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN STUDIES  
POSTGRADUATE PROGRAMME IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN  
STUDIES  
SPECIALISATION: EUROPEAN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY  
Postgraduate student: Evangelia Varsami

## **RUSSIA AND EUROPE**

### **Contents**

<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1. Russia and the European Union.....</b>	<b>2</b>
1.1. Introduction.....	2
1.2. EU policy towards Russia.....	3
1.2.1. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).....	3
1.2.2. The Common Strategy.....	4
1.3. The four common spaces.....	4
1.4. The economic relations between Russia and European Union.....	5
1.4.1. Russia, WTO and EU enlargement.....	5
1.4.2. The role of energy.....	7
<b>2. Russia and the Balkans.....</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1. Introduction.....	7
2.2. The pipelines and the influence of Russia in Balkans.....	8
2.2.1. The pipeline “Blue Stream”.....	9
2.2.2. The pipeline “Burgas - Alexandroupolis”.....	10
2.2.3. The pipeline “South Stream”.....	10
<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Books and articles.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Internet.....</b>	<b>15</b>

## **Introduction**

The sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union had as a result for Russia to spend the greater part of the 1990s in order to remedy the psychological hangover<sup>1</sup>. Given that uncertainty regarding the national identity of Russia, Russian political elites devoted in a debate in which issues about national interests were primal: Russian people who were living in other former states of the ex-Soviet Union had uncertain citizenship rights and status as well as an ambiguous relationship with Russia. In addition, Russia adopted a partly reformed soviet constitution and political institutional structures which created confusion. As a consequence, foreign policy as an issue in domestic politics played a secondary part<sup>2</sup>.

However, after a long period of weakness and instability, during the most of the decade of 1990, Russia has reappeared in world politics as a major security player. The reasons of this change are related to the President Vladimir Putin who contributed to the increased political stability of the country and to the economy of Russia which started to obtain steady growth<sup>3</sup>.

## **1. Russia and the European Union**

### **1.1. Introduction**

In May 2004, took place the last enlargement of the European Union and the latter obtained 10 new members states, eight among them – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia - are Central and Eastern European countries. Consequently Russia became its larger neighbour<sup>4</sup>. As a result, the enlargement

---

<sup>1</sup> Filis C., *Security challenges and interests: The role of third parties – The case of Russia*, brief outline.

<sup>2</sup> Shearman P., “*Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*” in R. Kanet and A. Kozhemiakin (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg, C. Pursiainen, (ed.), Introduction in “Russia as a Great Power. Dimensions of security under Putin”, p.1.

<sup>4</sup> Antonenko Ok., Pinnick K., “*The Enlarged EU and Russia: From Converging Interests to a Common Agenda*”, Introduction in O.Antonenko, K.Pinnick, (ed.), *Russia and the European Union*, p.1.

changed the borders of the European Union and arose many questions about the relations between EU and Russia, given that, in addition, Russia didn't have good relations with many of the new members<sup>5</sup>.

## **1.2. EU policy towards Russia**

### **1.2.1. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)**

In June 1994, at the Corfu European Summit, was signed the “*Partnership and Cooperation Agreement*”. The PCA sets as objective to increase economic relations between Russia and European Union, to encourage the democratic and market transition of Russia and to create a free-trade area. Although PCA's technical focus, it aims to promote the political dialogue of both sides in order to “bring about an increasing convergence of positions on international issues of mutual concern, thus increasing security and stability”<sup>6</sup>.

However, the PCA was never entered into force substantially, because of the unwillingness of the President Boris Yeltsin to reform sectors concerning, mainly, the economy. In addition, because of the first war in Chechnya, in 1994-1996, the PCA was implemented in December 1997<sup>7</sup>.

In June 2008, during the Summit between the European Union and Russia, the two sides decided negotiations on a new EU-Russia agreement. Both sides have made some commitments concerning human rights and democratic standards, notably in the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In July 2008 took place the first round of negotiations, but, because of the conflict between Russia and Georgia, the European Union postponed the second round of negotiations, pending, simultaneously, the withdrawal of Russian troops to positions held prior to August 7<sup>8</sup>.

---

<sup>5</sup> Lynch D., “*From ‘Frontier’ Politics to ‘Border’ Policies Between the EU and Russia*”, in O. Antonenko, K. Pinnick, (edt.), *Russia and the European Union*, p.18.  
p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> Lynch D., *op.cit*, p.18.

<sup>7</sup> Lynch D., *op.cit.*, p.19.

<sup>8</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/index_en.htm)

### **1.2.2. The Common Strategy**

In June 1999, in Cologne, European Union and Russia adopted the Common Strategy, which had as aim “Russia’s return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values, enshrined in the common heritage of European civilization”.

In order to achieve its objective, the Common Strategy set four aims, which are the following<sup>9</sup>:

- a) the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and the public institutions in Russia.
- b) the integrations of Russia into a common European economic and social space.
- c) the increase of stability and security in Europe and beyond through cooperation and
- d) the jointly response common challenges on the Europe, for instance nuclear safety, organized crime and environment.

### **1.3. The four common spaces**

In May 2003, at the St. Petersburg Summit, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their cooperation by creating in the long term four ‘common spaces’ in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and on the basis of common values and shared interests<sup>10</sup>. The issues that have been covered are:

- a) The Common Economic Space.
- b) The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice.

The issues regarding this “Space” are one of the first priorities in the relations between Russia and European Union and that’s why, at the Summit in May 2003, it was decided the establishment of a Permanent Partnership Council. The latter will deal with issues concerning the “Space”, the energy, the environment and the transport and will

---

<sup>9</sup> Lynch D., *op.cit.* p.19.

<sup>10</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/common\\_spaces/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/common_spaces/index_en.htm)

include meetings at the ministerial level and the participation of ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs<sup>11</sup>. However, the two parties still have different agendas concerning the issues of that Space, given that European Union consider as more important the organised crime and the illegal migration and, on the other hand, Russia the introduction of visa-free travel<sup>12</sup>. And that because of the enlargement of the European Union, which was the cause for the Russian citizens to lose the right the visa-free travel in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are obliged to respect the Schengen regime<sup>13</sup>.

c) The Common Space of External Security.

This “Space” concerns the international relations and the crisis management as well as the maintenance of peace and stability in the Balkans.

d) The Common Space of Research and Education

In May 2005, at the Moscow Summit, both sides agreed to develop the instruments to put these common spaces into effect. The “road maps” set out specific objectives and areas for cooperation for the short and medium-term. A number of dialogues has taken place between the European Union and Russia covering most economic sectors, including a number of regulatory dialogues which aim at promoting the gradual approximation of legislation<sup>14</sup>. Although that the reality of an open and intergrated market is still far, the existance of these road maps move Russia towards the social and economic model of the European Union<sup>15</sup>.

## **1.4. The economic relations between Russia and European Union**

### **1.4.1. Russia, WTO and EU enlargement**

---

<sup>11</sup> Antonenko O., “*Russia and EU Enlargement: From Insecure Neighbour to a Common Space of Security, Justice and Home Affairs*” in O.Antonenko, K.Pinnick, (edt.), *Russia and the European Union*, p.74.

<sup>12</sup> Antonenko Ok., Pinnick K., *op.cit.*, p.12.

<sup>13</sup> Lynch D., *op.cit.*, p.23.

<sup>14</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/common\\_spaces/economic\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/common_spaces/economic_en.htm)

<sup>15</sup> Bordachev T., “*The Strategic Implications of the EU’s ‘Crisis’. A Russian Perspective*” in M.Emerson (edt.), *Readings in European Security*, p.28.

The “Common European Economic Space” is connected with the entrance of Russia in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as member<sup>16</sup>. According to the summit, in November 2003, “The CEES will be based on existing and future commitments of the Parties in the PCA and WTO. Its scope shall be broader and deeper in comparison to the WTO and PCA provisions. Both Parties shall ensure that the CEES is compatible with existing or future commitments undertaken by the Parties in the context of WTO”. The first application of Russia in order to enter in WTO was in 1993, however, this aim was priority under the President Vladimir Putin in 2000. Russia is not yet member of WTO - although the prospects are increasing - given that there are many disputes between the sides, the most important of them is the energy prices<sup>17</sup>. However, Russia is a country with the Most-Favoured Nation status, through the PCA, and, as a result, its goods have the lowest available tariff in European Union.

Furthermore, regarding the enlargement of the European Union, it could have certain advantages and disadvantages for Russia’s exporters. More specifically, the advantages are the following<sup>18</sup>:

- a) the sold of products of Russia’s businesses to a market of half a billion consumers·
- b) the fall of the average manufacturing tariffs in the new members·
- c) the grant of the status of the Most-Favoured Nation from new members in Russia·
- d) the simplification of customs and transit procedures and
- e) the creation of business opportunities for third-country exporters.

On the other hand, the disadvantages can be:

- a) the fall of farm products under CAP rules·
- b) the compliance with tough product standards·
- c) a potential anti-dumping action against Russian steel and chemical companies·
- d) stronger competition in the European Union market and

---

<sup>16</sup> Mau V., Novikov V., “*Russia-EU Relations and the Common European Economic Space* ” in O. Antonenko, K.Pinnick ,(edt.), *Russia and the European Union*, p.104-105.

<sup>17</sup> Barysch K., “EU-Russia Economic Relations” in O.Antonenko, K.Pinnick, (edt.), *Russia and the European Union*, p. 124.

<sup>18</sup> Barysch K., *ibidem*, see Table 6.4, p.122.

- e) tougher visa requirements for business people who want to travel to the new members.

### **1.4.2. The role of energy**

The energy is a determinant factor than influence the relations between European Union and Russia: Russia is the third biggest trade partner of European Union, with supplies of Russia in oil and gas making up a large percentage of exports of Russia to Europe<sup>19</sup>. As a result, this relationship can be characterized as “*mutual interdependence of supply, demand, investment and know-how*”<sup>20</sup>.

More specifically, Russia is the largest producer and exporter of natural gas and oil – as well as Saudi Arabia – in the world, given that this huge country possesses more than 20% of the world’s known gas reserves and 5% of proven oil reserves and, also, the share of the energy and metals sector in the economy of Russia is around 20%, while it employs only 2% of the total labour force.

Given the recognition of the mutual interdependence, Russia and European Union inaugurated in 2000 an energy dialogue, which includes regular meetings of experts and political discussions during their biannual summits, in order to “raise all issues of common interest relating to the sector, including the introduction of cooperation on energy saving, rationalisation of production and transportation infrastructures, European investment possibilities, and relations between producer and consumer countries”<sup>21</sup>.

## **2. Russia and the Balkans**

### **2.1. Introduction**

The Balkans have been, historically, a major focal point of policy of Russia: In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, after the Crimean War, Russia increased its influence in the region. The

---

<sup>19</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/index_en.htm)

<sup>20</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/common\\_spaces/economic\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/common_spaces/economic_en.htm)

<sup>21</sup> Barysch K., op.cit., p. 124.

interest of Russia was due to two reasons: the first was strategic and the Balkans were seen important for the security and stability of Russia and also for its commercial and economic development, and the second was religious and cultural.

Afterwards, with the end of Cold War, Russia has started to develop its foreign policy in the area of Balkans, in which the developments of the Balkans and mainly the former Yugoslavia have played a very important role<sup>22</sup>.

The so-called humanitarian intervention of NATO in Kosovo in March 1999 against Slobodan Milosevic brought the relations between Russia and NATO to the worst point in the post-Soviet period, a fact that was considered by many Russian politicians “as a clear confirmation of the alliance’s aggressive designs”<sup>23</sup>. In addition, this operation coincided with the entrance of three ex-soviet allies – Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary - in the North Atlantic alliance and all these facts created a new geopolitical challenge for Russia as well as the occasion to change its policy towards NATO<sup>24</sup>.

After 11/9 and the war against terrorism, the relations between both sides were improved, but they were affected again by the war in Iraq in March 2003, given that Russia threatened to veto a United Nations resolution that legitimized the war<sup>25</sup>.

## **2.2. The pipelines and the influence of Russia in Balkans**

Russia has a monopoly which concerns the transit routes to consumer countries from the eastern Caspian shore, something that is unique in the world of energy and the geopolitics. This situation has a result the dual dependence of Europe on Russia, regarding the Russian supplies and the Russian transit of supplies from eastern Caspian shore<sup>26</sup>.

---

<sup>22</sup> Larrabee S., *Russia and the Balkans: old themes and new challenges*, in V. Baranovsky (ed.), *Russia and Europe. The emerging security agenda*, p. 389-390.

<sup>23</sup> Godzimirski J., “*Russia and NATO. Community of values or community of interests?*” in J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg, C. Pursiainen, (ed.), *Russia as a Great Power. Dimensions of security under Putin*, p. 58.

<sup>24</sup> Godzimirski J., *ibidem*, p. 57.

<sup>25</sup> Oldberg I., “*Foreign policy priorities under Putin. A tour d’horizon*” in J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg, C. Pursiainen, (ed.), *Russia as a Great Power. Dimensions of security under Putin*, p.35.

<sup>26</sup> Socor V., “*The Caspian-Black Sea Region: The Key to Diversifying Europe’s Energy Supplies*”, in M.Emerson (ed.), *Readings in European Security*, p. 116.

Concerning the countries in the region of Balkans, all of them, perhaps except Serbia, give more importance to their relations with United States and this is a negative point for the potential in relations with Russia. However, the latter became aware of its supremacy, regarding the energy, in comparison with the West and as a consequence, it signed a number of agreements concerning the sector of energy with countries in Balkans, as Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Greece as well as it realized buyouts of Bulgarian and Romanian energy companies<sup>27</sup>.

### 2.2.1. The pipeline “Blue Stream”

In November 2005, in northern Turkish city of Samsun, Russia, Turkey and Italy signed the agreement about the pipeline “Blue Stream”. This pipeline was constructed with the joint venture of the Russian *Gazprom* and the Italian *ENI*. With the creation of “Blue Stream”, Russia wanted to weaken the pipeline “*Baku – Tblisi – Cheyhan*”, which bypassed it, in order to maintain its acquis and influence in the area<sup>28</sup>. Blue Stream is aimed at Russian natural gas supply to Turkey via Black Sea, avoiding third countries, and this pipeline is an additional way for the existing gas transmission corridor from Russia to Turkey crossing the territory of Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, gas deliveries via this pipeline increase gas supply reliability in the aim of developing the gas market and infrastructure of Turkey<sup>29</sup>.

To sum up, “Blue Stream” is sign of growing economic influence of Russia in Turkey and another step of “Gazprom” in order to prevent other “players” from penetration into the Turkish and, mainly, the European natural gas markets, since Turkey is a hub for Caspian and Iranian gas, which has, as destination, European countries. Finally, it motivates the countries of Eastern Europe in search of new opportunities in order to obtain Caspian gas, given that they are aiming at alternative sources for the diversification of their natural gas supplies<sup>30</sup>.

---

<sup>27</sup> Filis C., *op.cit.*

<sup>28</sup> Δεδεγιάν Σ., *Τα κοιτάσματα της Κασπίας και ο πόλεμος των αγωγών*, [http://www.onassis.gr/greek/assoc/enim\_deltio/33\_06/article.php].

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article8895.shtml>

<sup>30</sup> Tsereteli M., “The Blue Stream pipeline and Geopolitics of natural gas in Eurasia”, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/view\_article.php?articleid=3848&SMSESSION=NO].

### 2.2.2. The pipeline “Burgas - Alexandroupolis”

The construction and the operation of the oil pipeline “Burgas - Alexandroupolis” is a great project of major significance for many sides: Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, the greater region and also the international oil community<sup>31</sup>. More specifically, “Burgas - Alexandroupolis”, which is an alternative route for Russian oil bypassing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, will transport Russian and Caspian oil from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas to the Greek Aegean port of Alexandroupolis<sup>32</sup>. As a result, with this pipeline, will be ensured an additional route, complementary to the Bosphorus Strait, for the transportation of oil to major markets in the Mediterranean, Europe and United States<sup>33</sup>.

This pipeline will be constructed and owned by *Trans-Balkan Pipeline B.V.* The Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline Consortium possesses the 51% of shares, which is a joint venture of Russian *Transneft*, *Rosneft* and *Gazprom Neft*. Bulgarian Burgas-Alexandroupolis Project *Company-BG*, which is a joint venture of *Bulgargaz* and *Transexportstroy*, owns 24.5% of shares and finally Greece consortium *HELPE S.A. - THRAKI S.A.*, a joint venture between *Hellenic Petroleum* and *Thraki*, which is owned by *Prometheus Gas* and the *Latsis Group*, owns 23.5%, while the Government of Greece has 1%<sup>34</sup>.

Finally, there are, also, many other pipeline projects, which transport oil from the Black Sea, bypassing Turkish straits. Among them, are the *AMBO pipeline* from Burgas to Vlore, the *Pan-European Pipeline* from Constanta to Trieste, *Odessa-Brody-Plotsk pipeline*, the *Kiykoy-Ibrice pipeline*, and the *Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline*.

### 2.2.3. The pipeline “South Stream”

---

<sup>31</sup> [http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/enhmerwtiko\\_entypo\\_mpoyrgas.pdf](http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/enhmerwtiko_entypo_mpoyrgas.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgas-Alexandroupoli\\_pipeline](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgas-Alexandroupoli_pipeline)

<sup>33</sup> [http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/enhmerwtiko\\_entypo\\_mpoyrgas.pdf](http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/enhmerwtiko_entypo_mpoyrgas.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgas-Alexandroupoli\\_pipeline](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgas-Alexandroupoli_pipeline)

The gas pipeline “South Stream” is going to transport Russian natural gas to Italy. Moreover, “South Stream” will partly replace the planned extension of “Blue Stream” from Turkey through Bulgaria and Serbia to Hungary and Austria. This pipeline is considered as a rival to the “Nabucco” pipeline and some experts consider that “South Stream” is a political project to counter “Nabucco” and to expand Russian presence in the area<sup>35</sup>.

Under the plan of “South Stream”, more than 550 miles of pipeline will be placed under the sea and across Bulgaria before splitting off in two directions, north through Hungary to reach Austria, and south through Greece and to Otranto, a port near the southeastern tip of Italy<sup>36</sup>.

More particularly, “South Stream” will start from the Beregovaya compressor station at the Black Sea coast in Russia and will run to Varna in Bulgaria, while its route will cross the continental shelf of Ukraine and Romania. *South Stream AG*, a joint company of *Gazprom* and *Eni*, will construct this section. Afterwards, from Varna, the south-western route will continue through Greece and the Ionian Sea to southern Italy. Greece, also, has proposed that the southern pipe may also supply the Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline. On the other hand, the north-western pipeline will run through Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to Austria at the Baumgarten gas storage. There is also another option that is the north-western route will run through Slovenia to northern Italy, while it is possible that two smaller parts will go through Bosnia and Herzegovina to the port of Ploče and another through Croatia to port of Rijeka and the pipeline will end in the port of Trieste in Italy. Finally, another option is that the South Stream pipeline will be connected to the *Wingas*, which owns *Haidach* underground gas storage, the second largest in Central Europe<sup>37</sup>.

## Conclusion

---

<sup>35</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_Stream](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Stream)

<sup>36</sup> [http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/06/26/greece\\_to\\_join\\_south\\_...](http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/06/26/greece_to_join_south_...)

<sup>37</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_Stream](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Stream)

To sum up, Russia and the European Union have a lot of things in common: history, culture, tradition, economic interdependence. Russia, also, is an insider in the political and economic life of European Union, “although there are no signs of its ‘Europeanisation’”<sup>38</sup> and the cooperation between these parties is necessary for the viability of the European intergration<sup>39</sup>.

On the other hand According to the energy issues, there is, without doubt, a strong mutual interest in a closer energy partnership between Russia the European Union. This partnership creates security for both of them: For Russia, the energy that the European Union buys from the latter contributes its economic growth as well as the improved living conditions of its population. And, for the European Union, the stable flow of reasonably priced energy remains an important motor for its economic growth<sup>40</sup>.

The large number of energy projects and Russia’s growing “have laid the foundations for a durable influence especially as in some cases it affects commitments on political choices” and “will give Russia a voice that the West will find difficult to defy, at least outright”<sup>41</sup>. As a result, it will be profit for the countries in Eastern Europe and, generally, for Europe to diversify supply and find alternative ways in order to provide oil and natural gas for their population. Only with this way Europe will reduce its dependence on Russia. For instance, a new pipeline from the Caspian region with destination to Ukraine and Europe will have as a result, firstly, the reduction of influence of Russia in Europe and, secondly, the strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Poland, two countries of which - Georgia and Ukraine - to aim at the accession to NATO<sup>42</sup>.

However, the major threat to energy security is not the threat of politically motivated gas ‘cut-offs’ but the lack of investment in new gas fields. Consequently, Russia should proceeds to the liberalisation of its markets and to the improvement of legal security for investors in order to penetrate into energy markets of Russia<sup>43</sup>.

---

<sup>38</sup> Bordachev T. *op.cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>39</sup> Bordachev T., *ibidem*, p. 28.

<sup>40</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/common\\_spaces/economic\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/common_spaces/economic_en.htm)

<sup>41</sup> Filis C., *op.cit.*

<sup>42</sup> Tsereteli M., *op.cit.*

<sup>43</sup> Piley A., “Energy Security, Gas Market Liberalisation and Our Energy Relationship with Russia” in M.Emerson (edt.), *Readings in European Security*, volume 4, p. 122.

## REFERENCES

### Books and articles

- Antonenko Ok.-Pinnick K., (2005), “The Enlarged EU and Russia: From Converging Interests to a Common Agenda” in O.Antonenko, K.Pinnick, (edt.), Russia and the European Union, London and New York, Routledge.
- Antonenko Ok., (2005), “Russia and EU Enlargement: From Insecure Neighbour to a Common Space of Security, Justice and Home Affairs” in O.Antonenko, K.Pinnick, (edt.), Russia and the European Union, London and New York, Routledge.
- Barysch K., (2005), “EU-Russia Economic Relations” in O.Antonenko, K.Pinnick, (edt.), Russia and the European Union, London and New York, Routledge.
- Bordachev T., (2007), “The Strategic Implications of the EU’s ‘Crisis’. A Russian Perspective” in Readings in European Security, volume 4, M.Emerson (edt.), Centre For European Policy Studies/Brussels, International Institute For Security Studies/London, Geneva Centre For The Democratic Control of Armed Forces/ Geneva.
- Δεδεγιάν Σ., Τα κοιτάσματα της Κασπίας και ο πόλεμος των αγωγών, [[http://www.onassis.gr/greek/assoc/enim\\_deltio/33\\_06/article.php](http://www.onassis.gr/greek/assoc/enim_deltio/33_06/article.php)].
- Filis C., (2008), Security challenges and interests: The role of third parties – The case of Russia, Brief outline, Hydra, July 4<sup>th</sup> , Summer seminar '08, July 3-5, “The Integration of Western Balkans into the Euroatlantic Structures”, Island of Hydra.
- Godzimirski J., (2005), Russia and NATO. Community of values or community of interests? in J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg, C.

- Pursiainen, (edt.), *Russia as a Great Power. Dimensions of security under Putin*, BASEES/ Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, London and New York, Routledge.
- J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg, C. Pursiainen, (edt.), (2005), Introduction in “Russia as a Great Power. Dimensions of security under Putin”. BASEES/ Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, London and New York, Routledge.
  - Larrabee S., (1997), “Russia and the Balkans: old themes and new challenges”, in V. Baranovsky (edt.), *Russia and Europe. The emerging security agenda*. Sipri, Oxford University Press.
  - Lynch D., (2005), “From ‘Frontier’ Politics to ‘Border’ Policies Between the EU and Russia” in O.Antonenko, K.Pinnick, (edt.), *Russia and the European Union*, London and New York, Routledge.
  - Mau V., Novikov V., (2005), “Russia –EU Relations and the Common European Economic Space” in O.Antonenko –K.Pinnick, (edt.), *Russia and the European Union*, London and New York, Routledge.
  - Oldberg I., “Foreign policy priorities under Putin. *A tour d’horizon*” in J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg, C. Pursiainen, (edt.), *Russia as a Great Power. Dimensions of security under Putin*. BASEES/ Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, London and New York, Routledge.
  - Piley A., (2007), “Energy Security, Gas Market Liberalisation and Our Energy Relationship with Russia” in *Readings in European Security*, volume 4, M.Emerson (edt.), Centre For European Policy Studies/Brussels, International Institute For Security Studies/London, Geneva Centre For The Democratic Control of Armed Forces/ Geneva.
  - Shearman P., (1997), “Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics” in R. Kanet and A. Kozhemiakin (edt.), *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, Macmillan Press/St. Martin’s Press.
  - Socor V., (2007), “The Caspian-Black Sea Region: The Key to Diversifying Europe’s Energy Supplies” in *Readings in European Security*, volume 4, M.Emerson (edt.), Centre For European Policy Studies/Brussels, International

Institute For Security Studies/London, Geneva Centre For The Democratic Control of Armed Forces,/Geneva.

- Tsereteli M., “The Blue Stream pipeline and Geopolitics of natural gas in Eurasia”,  
[[http://www.cacianalyst.org/view\\_article.php?articleid=3848&SMSESSION=NO](http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3848&SMSESSION=NO)].

### **Internet**

- [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/index_en.htm)
- [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/common\\_spaces/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/common_spaces/index_en.htm)
- [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/common\\_spaces/economic\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/common_spaces/economic_en.htm)
- <http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article8895.shtml>
- [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgas-Alexandroupoli\\_pipeline](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgas-Alexandroupoli_pipeline)
- [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_Stream](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Stream)
- [http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/06/26/greece\\_to\\_join\\_south\\_...](http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/06/26/greece_to_join_south_...)
- [http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/enhmerwtiko\\_entypo\\_mpoyrgas.pdf](http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/enhmerwtiko_entypo_mpoyrgas.pdf)