New Threats and Challenges for European Security

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Preface

The purpose of this collective volume is not to advance academic knowledge on the European Security concepts that will be discussed below but to familiarize the Greek public, policymakers and military officials with them. Issues like immigration, environmental and climate change and the economic crisis have been thoroughly examined but not up until now from a security perspective. At the same time, failed states cyber security and energy security have received attention abroad but in our territory, they are still relatively unknown or at best debated on a very limited scale.

Europe’s security environment and priorities are rapidly changing. There is no longer a threat from the East. The enemy now comes from a sub-state level or is invisible. The EU’s neighborhood has seen radical changes with the Arab Spring. The upheaval in the Middle East is far from over. Syria’s civil war nearly caused a US intervention while Iran’s nuclear question remains unanswered. The timing could not have been ever worst for Europe. Both USA and Russia are shifting their attention to Asia and China. The EU is muddling through the Eurozone crisis and with Britain being more skeptical than ever the years of introversion are not yet behind.

But throughout history, no one ever had the luxury of choosing to deal with crises at his own comfort. Even now, Europe has to formulate the security agenda and its priorities for the next decades with all the unavoidable limitations. A moderate but well pursued and implemented strategy is far better than no strategy at all. On this volume, we will present a number of threats to European security that we believe to be of the greatest importance now and for the forthcoming years. The analysis of the threats by the authors is coupled with propositions of measures and policies that can be taken in order to counter these threats on institutional level (EU and NATO). We hope that after reading the volume you will have gained sufficient knowledge on the issues examined and still have the appetite for further investigation.

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The impact of “failing states” on European security

by Andreas Theodorou

The following paper examines the threat of “weak” states to European security. Particularly, it purports to present the threats to domestic instability as factors of regional and international instability. Focusing on a reassessment of the threats and discussing the overall potential impact on European security, it finally concludes with a proposed dual-approach on the challenges from fragile states.

In the modern globalised word of individual states which constitute the so-called international community, new security challenges are triggered with the collapse of a single state for both its neighboring countries as to a further regional perimeter. It is to be examined which domestic dysfunctions could threaten European security.

Prior to that, a few introductory marks are needed. Referring to “failed states” preoccupies the reader with the assumption that a certain rational analysis has led the author to describe some states as “failed”. However, the purpose of this paper is to examine the security issues that arise from the process of the weakening of states and it does not suggest that the states would lapse into an ultimate state of “failure”. Therefore, the

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2 Crocker, Chester A., Engaging Fragile States, Foreign Affairs 82 (5), (Sept/October 2003), Council on Foreign Relations, p.35, Print
existent term\textsuperscript{5} “failing states” will conciliate this theoretical problematic with the need to comment on the phenomenon.

The term “failed state” has not a universal definition, nor is state weakness measurable\textsuperscript{6}. Over the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the loose application of many terms of political discourse has raised questions in the academic community. In the growing literature appeared terms like “rogue states”; “weak-states\textsuperscript{7}”; “quasi-states\textsuperscript{8}”; “diminished states\textsuperscript{9}”; etc. Most of those are imprecise\textsuperscript{10} like the term “failed states”, while others are too general, create misconceptions or define state entities with differing characteristics. It is indeed interesting why did the Westphalian “nation-state” succumb to the pressure of mass media.

But where do other states succeed\textsuperscript{11}? While a categorization of “failing states” will not be attempted, it is vital to briefly present the following main areas of state weakness.


\textsuperscript{12} […]the discourse on failed states largely rests on the idea of “statehood”; it juxtaposes “successful” (without ever explicitly using that term) and ‘failed’ states, bringing the two into sharp contrast, thereby highlighting the defining characteristics of the latter.(sic) in Sonali Huria, \textit{Failing and Failed States}, The Global Discourse, New Delhi: July 2008, No 75, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, p.1 accessed online http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/555787518IPCS-IssueBrief-No75.pdf on 14 Jul. 2013.
To start with, most indicators of a “failing state” concern its institutions. Practically, the prerequisites for the main function of a state are a government, security forces and a judicial system. However, their mere existence is not a necessary factor for the smooth facilitation of all state functions. In addition, for some states it may also be a matter of performance or credibility.

Countries facing unconstraint political instability will usually enter a vicious circle of political deadlocks or prolonged periods of short-term services of incumbents leading to state dysfunction; if the situation is prolonged, more political dead ends will eventually be faced. Note that these political repercussions may produce as a result the use of armed forces for the dominance of a leadership. The warring of political factions and the entanglement of armed forces to politics, as flawed as they are themselves, cannot be compared to the strife of civil wars.

Internal armed conflicts erupt inter alia as an attempt to gain control of a country or a certain region of it. The implications of civil conflicts are disastrous for the parts of the conflict, since it is self-evident that a country cannot prosper in times of war. During warfare, human rights are violated and state legitimacy is at stake. Furthermore, extended periods of war tensions will irreparably undermine domestic security. Internal conflicts, constant denial of the power of central authorities by armed forces or criminal groups, regional warlords etc. will all underscore the state’s legitimacy on use of force. While the above points concern

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13 Nor does state weakness is relative to emerging threats. In [Patrick, Stewart, Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers”, The Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 73, (January 2006), Web, http://ssrn.com/abstract=984057 accessed on 14 Jul. 2013] it is argued that connection to global threats and state weakness is not as clear and that weaker states may contribute less to threat “spillovers” than other less weak states.


non-international armed conflicts, the implications on regional security augment when a non-international armed conflict becomes internationalized.

In an internationalized non-international armed conflict, one or more of the opposing parts (i.e. non-governmental forces versus governmental or non-governmental forces) is assisted by a state. This distinction will help us examine the implications of the conflict on regional security. Therefore, the internationalization of a prima facie non-international armed conflict is not discussed as a sensu stricto legal term\textsuperscript{18}. Nevertheless, administrative capacity may be exercised by a non-central authority that does not seek to further expand its area of control.

While government legitimacy is hurt in a “weak” state and the above indicators of state fragility might corrode one another, the economy of such states is not only poor but continuously deteriorating. There can be the case when reforms have failed\textsuperscript{19}, although simple economy stumbles of developed countries or even long periods of economic crisis that robust economies face do not mean that even these states are “failing”. In order to comprehend the polymorphy of the economic problems and the abundance of issues that correlate to economy, the ever-growing issue of corruption will serve as an example. Afterwards, specific problems arising from the basic aforementioned indicators of domestic instability will be discussed.

It is a given that “failing states” are poor economies\textsuperscript{20} \textsuperscript{21} \textsuperscript{22}. The concentration of powers, nepotism and cronyism matched with the previous characteristics form the perfect

\textsuperscript{18} It was mentioned in the last sentence that a state may “assist” a part of the conflict. The argument is that from the moment a state gets actively interested for an internal conflict, we presume that the outcome of the conflict or the tension itself affects it directly or indirectly. Therefore, we do not have to examine whether the third party has for example used armed force before we suppose that its interests are at stake. However, this assumption does not mean that the internal conflict gets internationalized when it affects more than one states, otherwise there would hardly be any non-internationalized non-international armed conflicts (!)


\textsuperscript{20} See rankings online: The Failed States Index, The Fund for Peace, http://ffp.statesindex.org/fsitrends-2013

\textsuperscript{21} "In the economic arena, they ["failing states"] strain to carry out basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies or establish a legal and regulatory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise,
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environment for the unrestrained development of corruption. Corruption though is another concept which cannot be measured quantitatively\textsuperscript{23}. It is however true that it remains at the expense of the country’s citizens. Economic deficit and poverty strain the ability of a central administration to provide for the people. Thus, having to rely on corrupted officials advances the economic decline, as it bereaves invaluable resources from the people to the elites.

Economic disparities do not only accrue from the distinction between the “stakeholders” of corruption (i.e. the recipient and the contributor of a bribe). Needless to say, economic elites do not only depend on corruption in the long-term. Apart from the actual wealth possessed, growth may vary among cultural (e.g. religious), ethnic or even regional minorities\textsuperscript{24}. Uneven economic development\textsuperscript{25} cannot be as easily ascertained as by contrasting the income share of the economic elites to the rest of the community, but this unbalance is empirically evident to the naked eye due to the demographics of “failing states” and the rates of poverty.

Having presented the main possible\textsuperscript{26} indicators of domestic instability and having discussed their problematic nature in brief, it is deemed necessary to link the implications of the situation in “failing states” to international security. It has become a truism that contemporary states are interconnected as never before. If this applies to the developing and the least developed states as well, then the states have any reason to question their traditional security doctrines and adapt them to the challenges of this new era.

The problems arising from the dysfunction of institutions are the basis of disturbance in the work of the central government\textsuperscript{27}. Concerning the relations of the “failing open trade, natural resource management, foreign investment, and economic growth.[sic]”* , “The inhabitants of these weak and failing states are likely to be poor and malnourished, live with chronic illness and die young, go without education and basic health care, suffer gender discrimination, and lack access to modern technology.[sic]”, but in the same article it is stressed that “the weakest states are not necessarily the poorest.[sic]” in Stewart, Patrick, \textit{Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?}, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, Web http://www.cgdev.org/files/7034_file_06spring_patriottWQ.pdf accessed on 14 Jul. 2013


\textsuperscript{23} See reference 67.

\textsuperscript{24} However, these groups are “contributors”, rather than “root causes to nation-state failure”, as in: Rotberg, Robert I., \textit{The New Nature of Nation-State Failure}, The Washington Quarterly 25 (3), p. 86


\textsuperscript{26} For more general indicators that might not apply to a security study, see: http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators

\textsuperscript{27} Embracing the idea in the study cited below, the causality from “failing states” is viewed reversely as well; domestic factors may therefore produce threats to international security and these threats may influence negatively the prosperity of domestic societies and state institutions. See: Patrick, Stewart, \textit{Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers”}, The Center for Global
state” with other states, the lack of strong institutions prohibits stable relations. Ephemeral governments are not trustworthy, so as the long-term interstate co-operation is not easily achievable. Due to the lack of strong institutions, the participation of a “failing state” to international trade is also hindered, so the state cannot benefit from global economy. Having mentioned aforehand the poor economic situation of “failing states”, there is no room for a sustainable solution given the exclusion from global markets. It is vital to mention that “failing states” continue to hinge on international aid although it is not always clear whether the amounts of wealth exported from the developed countries are destined to humanitarian purposes, state-building, financial support of the government or some of the above. By any means, it is not easy to estimate how much did these uncalculated amounts of money assist in alleviating international security threats and which of the donor states did benefit the most from that service.

“Failing states” are most likely to export terrorism or be home to terrorist organizations. Although this is a given for most scholars and policy makers, it is deemed necessary to repeat in the present study the reasons why this happens. Terrorism is a peril which benefits the most from domestic instability, as presented; in fact, it is inevitable to avoid repetition. The implications of the lack of institutions make the state’s territory a perfect base of operations. It is argued that weakness of domestic institutions may pose a threat to other states. Where the rule of law is absent, terrorists can suffuse their activities.


The opportunity for terrorists to develop their operations is also augmented by political instability and the lack of good governance. Terrorists may enter the existent strife for political power indirectly by patronizing those who do not interfere with their activities or directly by seeking to gain themselves the political dominance or determining a regional area under their immediate control, thus depriving it from the control of central authorities. Whereas terrorists seek for power and a growing income, criminal activity is a means to strengthen their position.

Due to the poor economic situation in “failing states”, a high order of goods cannot be delivered to the citizens. Terrorist or criminal groups can provide for the people, thus associating with local communities, a pool from which new members or employees may be recruited. In addition, political insurgents may be recruited too. It is interesting to note that the ruling regimes use terror or other methods of terrorists to the locals, so as the indigenous people often are accustomed to the methods of terrorists or criminals and do not distinguish them us such. As a matter of perspective, this indicates that recruited people may not be stimulated to work in an organization that the western world would characterize as a “terrorist” one for idealistic or ideological rationale, as primarily for a necessity to survive. Piracy, for example, may be appraised as an admissible means of revenue.

The impact of criminal conduct involving illegal cross-border activities affects regional safety. Involving small arms and light weapons trade, drug trade, human

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trafficking or piracy, transnational crime poses a growing threat. Lastly, states are on the alert concerning the threat of weapons of mass destruction, more than the proliferation of small arms due to their potential impact. The existence of those materials raises questions as to their possible possessors.

Similar to terrorism, transnational crime cannot often be encountered in its roots. Terrorists and criminal organizations use their bases of operations as hideouts from persecution. Exploiting and further undermining the lack of rule of law and the power vacuum, they remain intact in the borders of a country while spreading their network of activities to other countries. The principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity as the basis of interstate relations define and confine state practice. Thus criminals and terrorists avoid confronting the authorities of a state where they operate by remaining in the asylum of a “full-statehood” territory.

The influence of criminal organizations on government officials - direct or indirect - has an impact on inter-state relations. On the other hand, close regional co-operation is needed to confront these common threats. “Weak” states are not indicated for state partnership, although this could be the answer to some of their problems.

Moreover, transnational crime brings social instability that impedes the autonomous development of local societies, as crime activity stands as an important source of income. “Failing states” are susceptible to transnational organized crime because they are not able to effectively control their borders, project in-state power and confront the criminal
organizations. In addition, transnational organizations may enjoy the protection of local communities, warlords or factions.

Networks of transnational crime are also involved in cybercrime which is a new threat to states and private firms. Transnational criminal organizations may be economic rather than political[45], but since world economy is dependent on cyberspace, they pose a threat to the global financial system. Last but not least, “failing states” host a series of challenges of our millennium, such as environmental degradation, energy insecurity, pandemic diseases,[46] and refugee flows.[47] These may be “secondary” problems to most, but as they can prohibit development in a state and also cause a spillover effect to a certain region, economic implications from “failing states” are not to be neglected.

State failure is a key threat to European security according to Europe security strategy[48]. To quote Hedley Bull “Security in international relations is not more than safety: either objective safety, safety which actually exists or subjective safety, that which is felt or experienced [sic].” From Europe’s perspective, state failure is profoundly associated with terrorism and organized crime. Both of these threats are argued to target Europe.

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Europe pursues policies against state failure viewing this problem as a source of the aforementioned threats. In addition, the standpoint is that state failure will expand a domestic problem to neighboring states, thus promoting regional instability.

It is not surprising that the Balkans is considered as a crucial area of European interests. The Balkans is a region disturbed by wars and economic distress in the past. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the graveness of the Yugoslav Wars alarmed the states of the European continent. With Kosovo still being a thorn in the heart of Europe, stability after the normalization of the situation in Balkans, now means fewer threats to European security and the continuation of the integration process.

In fact, accession to the European Union requires steps of reform. Bulgaria had been a country with severe domestic problems. It managed to harmonize its institutions to European standards. The European Union guides acceding states to the right direction, preventing state weakness through domestic reforms such as administration remedies.

Over the difficulties that affect policy-making in the European Union, progress has been made in the direction of a common security and defence policy. The Union’s leading role as a growing universal actor has been proven by its global involvement. In the context of the European Security and Defence Policy that has preceded the so-called Common Security and Defence Policy, the Union has deployed police missions, military operations, and other reform or advisory missions, some of whom provide assistance to other regional organizations. Combining civilian and military actions, assisting the setting up of autonomous or cooperative operations, and responding to the needs of the respective cases with appropriate deployments show that the EU has the ability to bring its forces into action.

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51 The Union’s response to Kosovo will be mentioned in references of the next paragraph although Kosovo does not enjoy statehood.
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54 EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT (Policy Advisory Team) in FYROM, EUPOL Kinshasa – DRC and EUPOL RD Congo, EUPOL and Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support in the Palestinian territories, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUFOR Tchad/RCA in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic.
55 Concordia in FYROM, Artemis in DR CONGO, Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOD RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad/RCA in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, EUNAVFOR Somalia – the EU military operation Atalanta.
56 EUJUST Themis in Georgia, EUJUST Lex in Iraq, EUSEC RD Congo, support to the actions of the African Union missions in Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM), EUMM (Monitoring Mission) and EUSP BST (Border Support Team) in Georgia, EUBAM (Border Assistance Mission) in Rafah, EUBAM Ukrain Moldova, EU SSR (EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform) in Guinea-Bissau, EULEX Kosovo, EUTM (Training Mission) in Somalia, EU CAP SAHEL Niger (to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces), EUCAP NESTOR (training mission under preparation, which will aim at strengthening the maritime capacities of eight countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean), EUAVSEC European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan, EUTM Mali, EUBAM Libya.
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Last but not least, cooperation with NATO is still crucial. Most of the European Union’s member-states are fervent supporters of NATO and many other states seek to cover under the NATO umbrella. NATO’s involvement in regional peace and security is apparent and irreplaceable through the decades. NATO is likely to persist in combating new threats. Coordination is key though, so as member-states to both the EU and NATO would not waste personnel or funds on overlapping activities; it would be reasonable to further define areas of competence on continuous missions or in future crises scenarios.

In this paper it is argued that the mentioned causes of and derivatives from domestic instability are threats to international security for the discussed reasons. To be alleviated from these dangers which beset the states persistently, a common proposal is to address state failure. However, examining the threats individually, one has to wonder whether this is a panacea. Alternatively, we could classify the following proposals to fight the threats which emanate from “failing states” as “direct” and “indirect”. This classification could prove useful, as it is also argued that states need to comprehend and assess each threat before taking actions to confront it, assuming that ambitious plans to balance all threats altogether are destined to fail.

Direct approaches are those who tend to battle the threats themselves. These include actions to address each threat individually. Direct approaches are more drastic and they usually do not include intervening actors. On the other hand, indirect approaches are those who confront the threats by the resulting consequences of a series of actions targeting another point. This proposed classification is not to bother policy-makers but security analysts. Therefore, it is common to distinguish both direct and indirect steps for the confrontation of a threat. This does not diminish the effectiveness of an applied method; on the contrary, a dual approach may prove more suitable.

Most of contemporary challenges to states relate to international security. But if “state failure” is sensed as one of these, is state-building the answer? The case of Somalia in contrast to the creation of South Sudan serves as an example. In Somalia, successful military operations have been deployed as a direct approach to encounter piracy. In the meantime, state-building has failed so far. However, the international recognition of South Sudan in

60 For aid on an effectively split part of a country, the case of Sudan, see: Piazza, James A., Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?, International Studies Quarterly, 52, 2008, p.88. Note that Somalia is also split but the Northern Somaliland has not gained its de jure independence or international recognition.
2011 led to the development of state capacities from third actors who did not resolve to intervine directly at that point.

The creation of new sovereign states has been highlighted as a possible solution for instability in Sub-Saharan Africa\(^{61}\)\(^{62}\). On the other hand, futile attempts to harmonize state institutions in order to build states similar to the western Westphalian model have been criticized\(^{63}\). But are we led from an anarchical society to global anarchy\(^{64}\)? It is recondite to foresee how many secessions will be tolerated by the international community. States continue to protect their interests\(^{65}\), so proposals for a European security that overlooks the interests of individual member-states are not viable, as long as the notion of a “European government” is afar. For the issues of international security, we may omit to take into


For a discussed proposal on redrawing boundaries to dysfunctional states, see: Crocker, Chester A., *Engaging Fragile States*, Foreign Affairs 82 (5), (Sept/October 2003), Council on Foreign Relations, pp.38-40, Print


consideration this procedure, since it may lead to independent states that might face a “failing” tendency as any other of the least-developed states.

For the purposes of this paper, the following method of response is proposed. To begin with, the evaluation and the distinction of the threats are imperative. For a collective European counter, policy planning is even more significant due to the diversity of the member-states. Furthermore, clear and common geopolitical objectives are essential for strategic thinking and policy making.

Whereas “state failure” is considered as a threat itself, a direct approach would require prevention. To strengthen institutions, the export of expertise and the deployment of civilian aspects of crisis management would be a priority. Anti-corruption methods fall in this category as well. In addition, the points of the next paragraph may serve as direct approaches, if managed by advocates of the European Union stationed in “weak” states. In the unfortunate case when prevention would not have been effective, the United Nations would provide the legislative framework for a rapid and unimpeded deployment of a European mission.

An indirect approach would require the closer cooperation between the European Union, the United Nations, and other regional organizations (e.g. the African Union). Coupled with strong bilateral relations, the European Union could propound itself as a key partner to regional or central authorities. Holding both a carrot and a stick, the Union could cooperate with political leaders, not only to strengthen their position – this is not ineluctable - but also to promote European interests. The European Union would then counsel the fragile governments to accept international aid in building state capacities and encourage them to further promote the institutionalization of their state. The liberalization of the economy would increase the well-being for the societies and although at a preliminary stage, it would show the way of reforms.

The precedent examples may be extended to all of the aforementioned threats. Anti-terrorism actions, such as the annihilation of a base of operations with an arsenal of

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66 Undoubtedly, prevention could apply through another direct approach too. In the following source, the proposed “liberalization of the economy” - as in the present document - is supported as “broad-based economy growth [sic] which is according to that author the “best way to prevent state failure [sic]”. Alternatively, another direct approach to prevent state collapse would be to help “weak states reform their security forces [sic]”.


68 For example, the European Union could establish the monopoly of violence of a central authority in a region by both deploying a police – border control mission (direct approach) or send personnel to train and assist local security forces (indirect approach).

weapons of mass destruction, would be implementing the direct approach\textsuperscript{70}. On the contrary, building state capacities would be an indirect approach to tackle terrorism and other threats, although it implements the direct approach to prevent the collapse of the state\textsuperscript{71}. It is the task of the policy makers to evaluate the threats and adopt the approach to suit their needs.

New challenges require optimal management of the existing institutions. To take advantage of the European Union in full, the member-states have to incorporate common views of geopolitical balances to settle on a new and more comprehensive European security strategy that may not be complete, but would address the common threats more effectively.

\textsuperscript{70} The idea of direct-indirect approach fostered in the present document, does not relate to military strategies.

\textsuperscript{71} It is mentioned that we perceive threats emanating from domestic instability as consequent causes of state-failure. In this manner, a policy pursuing to combat the threats of piracy and transnational crime would weaken warlords and criminal organizations; ergo, state-building would work faster.
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Financial Crisis: Threat or Opportunity?

by Polykarpos Tsempoglou

Since 2008, the European environment seems to be totally changed in every aspect, whether it is financial, social, political or even military. Europe is currently in an economic meltdown. Nowadays, the EU enforces a European austerity “recipe” backed by the vast majority of the European leaders as a means to slip away from the worst crisis since the establishment of the European Communities in the monumental year 1957. Of course, we refer to the sovereign debt crisis which had as a starting point Greece (back then) and now tends to become an issue with universal and especially transatlantic dimensions. In the field of defense two contrasted pictures could be sketched. On the one hand, the picture of a Europe tired of the economic readjustment policies affecting primarily the defense sector and on the other hand the contour of various emerging powers such as China and the other BRICS, countries experiencing a tremendous development in terms of strictly economic growth, and investing more and more money and resources to their defense industries. Bearing in mind these two different developments it becomes clear that in the near future the world and definitely the EU and the US will face and be forced to deal with security dilemmas of great importance.

Europe’s military spending is in a free fall. Since the outbreak of the crisis the EU countries as a whole reduced their defense spending radically and the situation for the EU becomes even worse as the time passes. Already many middle-sized EU countries have introduced cuts ranging from 10 to 15 per cent while smaller states have cut their spending by 20 per cent on average (O’ Donnell C., Centre for European Reform). Britain, an all time big spender in the military field is now forced due to the current financial circumstances to cut the expenditures severely. The British Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) resources budget is being cut by a further 249 million in the year 2013/2014 and by a 247 million in 2014/2015 and there is no optimism for UK’s military budget even after 2015/2016 (Chalmers M., 2013). The size of the British army is expected to shrink drastically from 102.000 troops to 82.000 by the end of the decade. British Royal Air Force now has only a quarter of the combat aircraft it had at its disposal in the 1970s and British navy has only 19 destroyers and frigates while in the 1977 the number had reached 69.

For France things are a bit different’ There were rumors and estimations that France was going to follow the same cut spending path in the aftermath of the presidential

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elections (Grand C., *Smart Defence*) The French intervention in Mali and the military needs stemming from this operation obliged president de la République Française, François Hollande to change his plans and go back on his socialist word to cut the defense expenditures. By contrast, France is going to keep its defense budget intact at least for the following six years (Irish J., - Vignal P., Reuters,), thus remaining the second largest military power in the EU after Britain. Despite this fact, the military budget freeze will still lead to a loss of 34.000 jobs in the ministry of defense over a period of five years in addition to the 54.000 personnel cuts announced by the former president Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008 (Security and Defence Agenda, *France cuts military*). For 2014, the budget will reach the amount of 31.4 billion euro or 1.7 per cent of the annual GDP a number below the 2 per cent demanded by NATO (Dempsey J., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). As a result, France maintains its capabilities to act on its own and undertake missions but on a much smaller scale, preserving a level of ambition for autonomous action (Dempsey J., *Ibid*).

We give an emphasis especially on Britain and France not only because these two countries are Europe’s major powers with the potential to act strategically but also two significant partners to the US and the North Atlantic Council. Today, it becomes evident that the crisis and the ongoing cuts make the European future even more uncertain and blur than it already seems. Though, even today Europe as a whole remains the second largest defense spender globally. States like Finland and Denmark continue to spend a steady amount of money in defense while others such as Poland and Sweden increase their defense budget. These recent developments in European security not only raise serious concerns about Europe’s future but also put in risk the future of the European Security Industries which is widely interconnected. There is a possibility that the production of military capabilities might be relocated closer to new emerging clients and to countries which provide cheaper labour cost (Guarascio F., Public Service Europe) and lower environmental standards as competition with new and emerging Asian manufacturers becomes harder and harder. The source of the problem is not the extensive cut spending in the EU, a thing that constitutes a reality. The available funding is used in an ineffective way. In the European case, incidents of duplication of military material and duplication of efforts are not something uncommon. Moreover, it is rather impressive that the EU during the 2006-2010 spent half of the total defense budget on military personnel while military personnel represents 80 per cent of total personnel working in the EU institutions (EDA, *EU and US government Defence spending*).

The efforts to tackle the problem of duplication are not an easy task. The financial crisis offers a unique opportunity for synergies and efforts to save valuable time and public money. Duplication hampers the progress of the European defense industry from benefiting from the creation of economies of scale. One distinguishing mark of this unnecessary and inutile duplication of effort are the three (!) European manned fighter jet programs (Rafale, Eurofighter and Gripen). EU officials have realized that cooperation is the key to a brighter future. So, there is a growing pressure to engage in defense and armaments cooperation. In this spirit, several initiatives have been launched both in NATO’s context and in an exclusively European one. But especially in the case of Europe the idea of promoting
cooperation through pooling and sharing is not something easy at all. Progressive cooperation which mathematically paves the way for defense industries integration and consequently to mergers probably may also lead to job losses a consequence rather painful in a period with already high unemployment rates across Europe (on average 12 per cent), as Germany refusal to support the merger of BAE and EADS revealed. Another serious issue is nations’ reluctance to share capabilities in the field of defense that has its origin on their fear that their partners may block their access to shared capabilities if a proposed action is disapproved (O’ Donnell C., Centre for European Reform). Besides, defense and security are sensitive parts for a state’s own existence, constituting the so called hard core of competencies of every Westphalian type of state. Perhaps that is why EU leaders rarely discuss defense or security issues at a Summit level (Dempsey J., Europe: What defense?). Moreover, the majority of Europeans, nurtured with a pacifist point of view which does not include the use of force, don’t feel the existence of a power with the potential to disrupt their everyday peaceful life (with the exception of terrorism) so, the European leadership cannot conveniently justify to the public opinion any potential moves or even talks about defense and armaments issues (Dempsey J., Ibid). These are the main reasons why only few steps have been made so far towards this path.

The most significant initiatives are NATO’s Smart Defense launched in the Chicago council in 2012 and EU’s Pooling and Sharing. Some other sub regional and bilateral programs have been initiated lately including regional groupings such as NORDEFCO or the 2010’s Franco – British Treaty. All these projects are based on the notion that cooperation in Research and Technology sectors and better coordination of effort cost less money hence using the existing budget in an efficient way and redressing capability shortfalls.

In the European context the idea of promoting cooperation is not something new. It dates back to the year 2003 when the Europeans detected several capability shortfalls soon after launching the Common Security and Defense Policy despite the very ‘humble’ and uninspiring objectives (deployment of 60000 troopers within a time limit of one year). Later, in 2004 the European Defence Agency was established, having as primal objectives among others the support of its members (26 member states) in the development of their capabilities. After a series of unsuccessful attempts such as the 2006’s Capability Development Plan (CDP), during the first half of the Belgian Presidency of the EU, the 26 defense ministers discussed at Ghent the introduction of a closer cooperation framework giving the process of pooling resources a new lease of life. The defense ministers identified their specific national requirements and pointed out opportunities of cooperation. This discussion known as the Ghent Initiative finally gave birth to EDA’s Pooling and Sharing Initiative. For now, “Pooling and Sharing” has become a guiding principle of the EDA beyond the specific identified cooperation projects. Some of the most successful projects within the Pool and Share framework have been the programs for training helicopter staff and jet pilots, projects targeting the creation of a database which could be used as information and intelligence board for naval and maritime purposes as well as the development of modular hospitals, air – to – air refueling, European transport hubs and smart munitions. The citation of these projects (existing or future) just above shows one main element’ It is the reflection of the low ambitions and a lack of high aspirations of the EU officials. Moreover, the
participation of Britain in this initiative constitutes a drawback as long as it does not allow by blocking any potential moves of growing in terms of finance and personnel. Maybe, this also the reason why it is a strictly bottom up intergovernmental process and less bureaucratic even than NATO’s Smart Defense initiative (Center for Security Studies, 2012: 2).

NATO’s Smart Defense Initiative came in the wake of Europe’s Ghent Initiative as an alternative to European Pooling and Sharing. North Atlantic pool and share initiative strongly resembles to the European initiative. However, NATO gaining experience from the Cold War era has got a much more developed and matured infrastructure and greater experience than the recently founded EDA. According to NATO, it promotes a culture of sharing among NATO allies based on three constituents: Prioritization, specialization and cooperation. Prioritization is the answer to the need for member states to align their capabilities with the latest North Atlantic strategic concept and the capability requirements for NATO forces 2020 which do not coincide with them. Specialization till now has not received much attention from member states except certain special cases of the Baltic region such as Estonia and Czech Republic. It refers to a plan according to which states should be focused to maintain certain national capabilities and consequently acquiring expertise. Other capabilities will be offered by partner countries taking into account their requirements in a framework of cooperation and mutual trust. Smart Defense capability pooling projects are organized in large groupings that cover for example surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, sustainment, ballistic missile defense, training and preparation of forces, protection of the forces and effective engagement. Participation in these large groupings is based on a voluntary basis. For each pooling project one country gets appointed as a leader, a practice adopted by the EU in 2002 under the Headline Goals of 2003 (Maulny J. - P., 2012: 3). In general, these multinational projects are categorized into three distinct tiers. Tier 1 projects are projects already approved and for which the leading state member and the other participant have already been decided. There is always an advance in Tier 2 projects which are about to be implemented as the tier 1 projects in the appropriate time. In tier 3 all the ideas that could be translated into future pooling projects are gathered. By analyzing the Smart Defense initiative it becomes clear that every single NATO’s pooling program is much more ambitious than every other European in relative terms. The critiques expressed are coming mainly from many French officials who argue that the US uses Smart Defense as a Trojan horse to invade the European Defense Scene via promoting the US military–industrial complex. Nevertheless, this critique shows how worried are the Europeans and French about the possibility to lose considerable defense contracts.

Although, Pooling and Sharing and Smart Defense are the euro-Atlantic answer to defense budget limitations in these times of austerity forms of defense and armaments cooperation in a sub regional level should not be ignored. These sub regional groupings are being formed by states with already strong ties of partnership based on a common culture, good neighbouring relations and similar security interests (Center for Security Studies, 2012: 3). At this point it is worth mentioning some of them. Definitely the most advanced sub regional initiative is the Nordic Defense Cooperation (or just NORDEFCO) formed in 2009. This initiative is the outcome of decades of relations based on peace and partnership among the five Nordic states. Cooperation in this initiative gives close attention to the areas of
training and exercises, human resources, long – term strategic development. Other sub regional or bilateral worth mentioning initiatives are the 2010 agreement between Britain and France which aims to explore all the fields of possible synergy in defense issues such pooling forces, industrial capabilities with the incorporation of the missile sector in MBDA, existing national capabilities (i.e. air – to air refueling) etc the deepening cooperation among the four Visegrad countries in Central Europe, the Austrian initiative to create a regional structure with the participation of Visegrad and non – Visegrad countries such Croatia as well as some other initiatives with clearly topical character functioning on an ad hoc basis such as the agreement between Bulgaria and Romania to police jointly their national airspaces and Belgium – Holland cooperation in helicopter maintenance.

The Euro crisis should and probably will become a great lesson for the future. Europe is in the middle of a crisis while at the same time its Mediterranean periphery is in upheaval. EU leadership and EU officials should put aside everything that holds them back from cooperating in defense. The deterioration and damage of the military caused by the budget restraints and the unwillingness to see the reality is about to be continued. Europe is obliged to adapt and make some bold steps towards cooperation and burden sharing otherwise it will lose the necessary potential and dynamic to conduct operations in hostile territories (i.e. Libya, Mali). The fragmentation of burden sharing into several different initiatives does not lead to the feelings of unity among the States. Cooperation must be forged among all the EU allies and this requires the commitment from every single EU state to only one Initiative.
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A Critical Approach to Environmental Security

by Apostolia Papadopoulou

How can we define the content of “environmental security”? 

The notion of security has for too long been defined parochially as the territorial security from external attack, or as the shield of national interests in foreign policy or as the global security from the threat of a nuclear aggression. In the 1990s, within the end of the Cold War and the process of globalization, the concept of security underwent a period of conceptual turmoil. As a result, a large number of security definitions appeared, one of which was that of Human Security as fostered by the United Nations Development Program. This definition is much more anthropocentric and responds to new global problems that are not aware of state borders as a threat to all humanity, as environmental problems.

The last three decades, it is widely known that environmental factors play direct and indirect roles both in political disputes and violent conflicts. Because of that, we have seen a convergence between traditional national security thinking and environmental protection and policy development. They have come together to frame, indubitably, a new field of environmental security.

The notion of environmental security by its nature encompasses many different parameters, consequently until today there is no widely accepted official definition of it. The United Nations Development Program refers to it briefly in its annual report in 1994 on human development on page 28: "Environmental threats countries are facing are a..."

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73 Apostolia Papadopoulou was matriculated at the department of International and European Studies of Panteion University in 2007. She majored in International and European Institutions and minored in International Relations. During her academic career she completed numerous studies covering various fields of international and historic interest, such as: “The Final Solution” (Bachelor’s Thesis), “The Russia- USA- NATO Relations From 1990 until the 11th of September”, “International Policy and Environment: Three Generations of Human Rights”, “The Status of Information and Public Participation in Environmental Governance” (for which a survey was conducted about greek enviromental governance in particular) and many others. Since 2012 she has been working as a young researcher at the Institute of International Relations, in the NATO-Europe sector.


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A combination of the degradation of local ecosystems and that of the global system. These comprise threats to environmental security.

Another complication on the concept of environmental security is the lack of agreement on the problem that it is intended to arrange. In some respects, environmental security is the answer to a question that was never asked (Brock, 1997). At this point, we should underline a very interesting approach to environmental security problems by Jon Barnett in his book “The Meaning of Environmental Security”, where he makes clear that we should examine environmental insecurity as “a function of the most general problem of environmental degradation. Furthermore, environmental degradation is in turn, a function of resource and pollution-intensive forms of development coupled with poverty-driven rapid population growth. Hence, environmental problems such as biodiversity loss, climate change, acid rain, and shortages of fresh water, food and fuelwood can all be seen as products of modern particularly post-cold war development practices and the social disparities they produce”. In other words, an upright attempt to address environmental insecurity problems should embed to the wider social, environmental and developmental environment. As Aristotle once said, “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”

Environmental Stress as Cause of a Conflict

States have often tried to take control over energy supplies, war materials, land and other significant environmental resources. Consequently, there is an obvious link between environment and interstate conflicts. A research about the link between environmental change and violent conflict has been accomplished by Homer-Dixon and associates, from the work carried out at Toronto. According to his research, environmental scarcities cause violent conflicts especially in the developing world and are considered as the beginning of more diffuse and intense conflicts in the near future.

In addition, Dixon underlines that there are mainly six types of environmental change that used to be the most common causes of conflicts.

- Greenhouse-induced climate change
- Stratospheric ozone depletion
- Degradation and loss of good agriculture land
- Degradation and removal of forests

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http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/iheid/shared/summer/IA2009_readings/MD1.pdf
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- depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies
- depletion of fisheries

Based on the above, he categorizes the conflicts in three particular types: the “simple scarcity conflicts or resource wars”, the “group identity conflicts” and the deprivation conflicts”. There are countless examples throughout history which can confirm the above theory and we should cite some of them. In the southwestern part of Bangladesh, the government had undertaken the Coastal Embankment Project in the 1960s without taking into consideration its environmental impacts. Initially, this project contributed to the better agricultural production. However, it irreversibly affected the region’s ecosystem. As a result of such unplanned development project, a whole range of economic disasters such as water-logging and silting of rivers affected the region. The project hampered the productivity of the soil and thereby forced residents to migrate to already over populated urban areas in search of a better livelihood. Another example comes from Somalia. In the 1960s, as a result of deforestation and favored by improper agricultural practices and population increase, there was a widespread soil erosion in Ethiopia’s Highlands. As a result, it was observed decline of farmland, inefficiency of agriculture, food shortages and exploding prices that led to urban riots. The neighboring Somalia had to face similar problems. Most of Somalia’s rivers rise in Ethiopia, and Somalis worried that Ethiopian migrants might divert water for irrigation. In 1977 the two countries went to war until 1979. Supported by the late superpowers with supply of arms, the region could not yet recover properly.

Another prospect comes from Shaukat Hassan as in Adelphi Paper examines the connection between the environmental substructure of a nation and its effect on the economy. According to his view, environmental disasters decrease the economic growth of a nation, encumber its social continuity, and destabilize its political structure.

There are debates on environment as the primary source of conflict or cause of war. Alan Dupont argues that environmental difficulties are unlikely to be the primary cause of major conflict between states. Environmental issues, according to Dupont, interact with more direct causes of conflict to prolong or complicate existing disputes. For example, environmental degradation can create refugee crisis between two neighboring countries.

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Now, refugee issues may aggravate conflicts in between the neighbors. Thus environment is not the direct cause of a conflict.

**EU environmental policy**

In December 2011, European Union High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton stated: “we need to be able to respond to the complex threats of today; violent crises, cyber- treats; energy security”\(^{85}\). The EU is recognised as a leading proponent of international action on environment and is committed to promoting sustainable development worldwide. The 35 years European experience of environmental policy-making has to demonstrate over 200 legal acts which have been applied and strategic paths have been settled on\(^{86}\). It is commonly accepted that in EU, citizens enjoy some the world’s highest environmental standards. Nevertheless, no matter how robust internal EU environmental legislation is, it cannot shield us from the negative consequences of trans-boundary and global environmental degradation, nor does it sufficiently reduce the impact of the EU’s economic growth on natural resources worldwide. Confronting the global challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss and biosafety, deforestation, air and water pollution, chemicals management, horizontal legislation, Industrial Pollution Control, Risk Management, Nature Protection\(^{87}\) - to name but a few - needs real commitment and effective cooperation at the international level\(^{88}\).

Strengthening of natural capital, promoting a "ecological economy" and ensuring the health of European citizens are at the forefront of European environmental policy. Additionally, common environmental strategy across Europe, ensuring the necessary level playing field for all business activities. In the 1970s and 1980s the focus was on traditional environmental topics. Now, emphasis is given on a more systematic approach that takes account of links between miscellaneous themes and their global dimension. This means moving from remediation to prevention of environmental degradation.

As it was mentioned at the beginning, the environmental problems are global and consequently do not stop at the Union’s borders. Air, water, seas and wildlife know no boundaries. The more we encourage the neighboring countries to adopt high standards, the higher will be the quality of our own environment. The Union is cautious to ensure that countries wishing to join the EU bring their own environmental legislation up to these requirements. It works closely with its neighbours to encourage them to do the same and plays an active role in international negotiations on sustainable development, biodiversity and climate change. While some might think of it as a marginal concern, the environment is actually at the heart of EU policy. When Member States sign up to the Treaty on European Union, one of their obligations is to work towards ‘a high level of protection and


\(^{86}\) http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/policy/intro

\(^{87}\) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/index_en.htm

\(^{88}\) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/
improvement of the quality of the environment’ (Article 3(3)), as the architects of the European Union recognised the importance of a clean and healthy environment. Policies must be based on sound evidence that provides an understanding of the causes and impact of environmental change so that appropriate responses and strategies can be devised. Much of this data comes from national sources and is analysed by the European Environment Agency, which provides input into the EU’s environmental policy.

The entrance of a new member state in the European Union is directly linked to the harmonization of its environmental policy in line with European environmental standards. Consequently, the enlargement of the European Union indirectly raises environmental standards across the continent. Aligning existing national legislation with European rules is complex, since environmental responsibilities can cut across many different agencies, departments and stakeholders. The European Commission supports candidate countries with technical expertise and finance.

Pollution from neighbours has a direct impact on the EU, and vice versa. In addition, natural resources like water, air, soils and biodiversity are connected in complex ecosystems across the region. This interdependence demands a region-wide system of environmental protection and recovery. For this reason, the EU gives priority to environmental cooperation with the countries along its borders. To the south this means North Africa and the Middle East and to the east the countries of eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

The role of the EU is extremely significant in international environmental negotiations, in diverse fields of environmental security, as protecting biodiversity, promoting sustainable development or corraling climate change. The thrust of the EU approach is to emphasise the importance of the sustainable management of resources and natural capital, particularly in developing countries since these are crucial in tackling poverty. These same countries are the first to be affected by environmental degradation since floods, droughts and other natural disasters undermine efforts for their economic and social development.

The EU played a key role at the 2010 biodiversity summit in Nagoya. This led to an agreement on an ambitious global strategy to combat biodiversity loss and a package of measures to ensure that the planet’s ecosystems continue to sustain future human wellbeing. In Brazil in 2012, the Rio+20 conference on sustainable development underlined the need for more concerted action to address global environmental challenges. The EU will strive to help translate the Rio commitments into actions, both within the EU and globally.

The environment cannot be considered as separate from the economy any longer. The increasing use of limited global resources leads to rising prices. Europe’s economy needs to be transformed to derive more value from fewer materials, and changes in consumption patterns are necessary. Policies to encourage research, bring eco-innovation to the market

89For more information, http://www.unccd2012.org/content/documents/814UNCSD%20REPORT%20final%20revs.pdf
and raise consumer awareness all contribute to this transformation. The EU already has unparalleled information resources and technologies, an established culture of precaution and prevention and a strong record of rectifying damage at source and making polluters pay. Better implementation of existing policies will help provide regulatory stability for businesses.

There is no escaping the fact that Europe and its environment also face some serious global challenges. These include an increasing world population, growing middle classes with high consumption rates, rapid economic growth in emerging economies, constantly rising energy demands and intensified global competition for resources. Most of these are outside our direct influence, but the EU can nonetheless help other countries move towards more sustainable development by promoting more effective environmental governance globally\textsuperscript{90}.

**NATO and its environmental strategy**

As outlined in the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO plays a key role in identifying and addressing current and emerging security challenges. Consequently it is obvious that NATO could not exclude the environmental challenges from its strategic programme.

NATO’s environmental strategy, is supported by the Science for Peace and Security Programme, or SPS, “a policy tool for enhancing cooperation and dialogue with all partners, based on civil science and innovation, to contribute to the Alliance’s core goals and to address the priority areas for dialogue and cooperation identified in the new partnership policy”\textsuperscript{91}. Both energy security and environmental security consist key priorities, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept as agreed by Allies in Lisbon in November 2010 and the Strategic Objectives of NATO’s Partner Relations as agreed in Berlin in April 2011.

*Regarding environmental security, NATO’s strategy underlines:*

- Security issues arising from key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs, which have the potential to significantly affect NATO’s planning and operations
- Disaster forecast and prevention of natural catastrophes
- Defense-related environmental issues\textsuperscript{92}.

*The Alliance is also actively interested in coordinating civil emergency planning and response to environmental disasters. It does this principally through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EARDCC) that was launched following the earthquake disaster in Turkey and Greece at the end of the 1990s.*


\textsuperscript{91} The Science for Peace and Security Programme: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A2984B42-00680DB8/natolive/topics_85373.htm?

\textsuperscript{92} The Science for Peace and Security Programme: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A2984B42-00680DB8/natolive/topics_85373.htm?
On the other hand, NATO takes the responsibility of the environmental consequences which military operations usually have on the environments in which they occur. Part of NATO’s responsibility is to protect the physical and natural environments by taking all reasonably achievable measures. These range from safeguarding hazardous materials (including fuel and oil), standardization of procedures and training, to treating waste water, managing waste and reducing fossil fuel energy consumption. Strict rules have been adopted by many NATO countries, reflecting the growing awareness of protecting the environment. In line with these developments, NATO is facilitating the integration of environmental protection standards into all NATO-led military activities.

Conclusion

In one way or another, most cultures have acknowledged the importance of nature and its biological diversity for their societies and as a result were led to the understanding that they must maintain it. Yet, power, greed and politics have affected the precarious balance. As mentioned above, most environmental issues are global in nature and know no national boarders. European legislation is an effective tool in promoting environmental security and the gradually enlargement of the Union, creates a wider, common environmental strategy which is of great importance for accomplishing a global welfare and an environmental justice (the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies).

The achievements of NATO, on the other hand, are significant and it is believed that they will be long lasting. The link between defense, national security and environmental security is obvious and consequently the confrontation of the emerging environmental perils is one of the Alliance’s core goals. Environment and human security are two of the greatest challenges to modern society in the new millennium. NATO has a unique opportunity to promote further understanding of their interrelationship, from a position of strength and knowledge. It would be a tragedy to back away now.

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New Threats and Challenges for European Security


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Nowadays, we face more intensely the consequences of the wrong policies that were taken place in the last decades, which have affected to a large extent our everyday life. For instance, the water we need and the food we produce to meet our needs. The indiscriminate exploitation of the environment, such as the deforestation, the desertification, the extinction of species, the acid rain and the reckless use of natural resources, have contributed to the environmental pollution and climate change.

The negative impact on the environment started with the industrial revolution, which began in England in 1760. When we refer to the industrial revolution, we mean the introduction of the industrial system and the automation of production by using machines, meaning the replacement of the manual labor, the introduction of new forms of energy and the rash development of the transportation system. The negative consequences of the industrial revolution include the destruction of the natural areas by the establishment of new industries, combined with the instant need to find raw materials and the reckless use of these sources, adding also the discharge into the environment of waste materials, and generally harmful substances. Moreover, the urbanization increased largely due to the establishment of the industrial areas in cities, thus contributing to the degradation of the environment by polluting and infecting the ground and especially the water. In addition to the above, and in the short foreseeable future, we will have to face the consequences of polluting the land and water with chemical waste. All these concurred, that the natural environment in Europe and in other continents where the Europeans had colonies, had radically changed in a way that the inhabitants faced perpetual serious problems in their everyday lives, that had, and have to do with the quality of their environment and the policies that were taken for protecting it, and the effectiveness of those policies.

Trying to achieve a balance between development and enhancing people’s everyday lives includes many dangers that are not always notable, but could likely affect them in a negative manner. Security should always be taken into consideration when making policies to achieve the evolvement. A number of individual securities must be met in order to achieve human security, for instance, a good level of health and well-being, adequate and
safe food, a secure and healthy environment, means to a secure livelihood, protection and fulfillment of fundamental rights and liberties, and many others. According to the Hague Ministerial Declaration on Water Security in the 21st century, water is required to ensure that these securities are met, from access to water supply at the individual or community level, to the peaceful sharing and management of water resources across political borders.

Water and food security has been gaining ground in the global political agenda and is earning attention from national governments at the highest level, in particular for its links to peace, national and international security, but also for its implications to development issues. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization, water security is defined as the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustainable livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development for ensuring protection against water-born pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability. There is a great need of including water security in the formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals. By doing this, highly considered issues will be implemented better and could be solved easier, as they will be more effectively managed. Issues that are relevant to water security, are things that have to do with conflicts and fragility, environmental instability, growth and employment, health, hunger, food and nutrition, inequities, energy, and of course water.

One of the United Nations Millennium Goals is food security; to halve the number of people suffering from hunger in the period between 1990 and 2015. As food security, we mean a “situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. It is substantial to achieve that goal, because it is combined with many other issues that are related to food security. Apart from the nutrition of people globally, it has an effect on the economy and the energy need to fulfill our needs. It is also combined with the immigration, urbanization, climate change and so many others.

The problem that is caused from food insecurity is more observable in the developing countries. Because of food scarcity, they face their policies to manipulate vital issues, which they encounter constantly, but are not capable to solve and which are associated with the nutrition of their population. Asia and Africa constitute a shelter for a majority of the people live in poverty and food insecurity. In contrast, North America, Europe and Oceania are the countries of cereal surplus. Nowadays, one in seven people in the developing countries receive insufficient protein and energy from their diets; that is owing to the rapid growth of the population in the developing counties and their inability to produce the sufficient amount of food, or to import it, because of the high prices. The increase in food prices will gradually exceed supply and will require a rapid expansion of food supply and an increase in efficient production, storage and delivery of food products. The failure of states to meet those demands will result in higher food prices. An increase in

99 www.fao.org
100 www.unep.org, Food and ecological security identifying synergy and tradeoffs.
food production may include the intensification and expansion of agriculture through greater monocropping, intensive irrigation and use of transgenic crops, chemical fertilizers and pesticides that, in long-term, are going to degrade the ecosystem’s ability to provide services to society. While water deficit presents a rigid constraint to food production, food insecurity and starvation are rather a direct result of low incomes, and that’s because water is an important limiting factor to domestic food production in water scarce countries. Countries, in which the water resources are below the threshold, prefer to import the amount of food they need, rather than to produce it locally, because it is more expensive in that way. But, there are also countries that lack the financial capacity to import, and in those cases starvation is likely to occur.

Because of the water and food scarcity we face, the need for development and application of locally suitable technologies and an improvement in water and food management efficiency is necessary, that will have a greater role in dealing with water scarcity and will enhance food security. Except for Denmark, Poland and Belgium in the temperate Europe, and a number of small islands states, all the countries in that continent have water resources over 2200m³/capita year, excluding them from the water-scarce country list in any existing classification. Many countries in Africa and South Asia face a great water scarcity threat. This phenomenon could possibly evolve as a threat to European Security, because of the number of immigrants from those countries that are coming in large waves even today to Europe. According to the latest revision of the U.N. population prospects, it is estimated that the world population is projected to grow from 7.0 billion in 2010, to 7.5 billion in 2020, 8 billion in 2030 and 9.1 billion in 2050. The food and water scarcity in those countries in combination with the crisis they face and the perpetually growing number of people, could result that those populations will try to find another place to live and most possibly that will be Europe because of its growth and relative safety. If we take into account the number of people living in those countries and the constant growth through the decades, it is obvious that Europe will not be in the position to offer them food security, and the question is in which way immigration will threaten the European security.

Furthermore the pollution caused by agriculture in short-term will have an impact on food security, since polluting an ecosystem means polluting the ground, the air and the water, which through the deforestation, the land-use changes, the climate change, will have an impact on water cycle and the water availability. The intensive use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides in pursuing higher production has been rapidly becoming environmentally hazardous in many areas in the world. Pollution and environmental degradation have further aggravated the water scarcity by reducing the availability of useable freshwater. Attention should be paid in developing countries, where the

101 Ibid.
102 pubs.acs.org, Swiss Federal Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, publication date: June 12, 2003.
103 In conflict areas and disaster zones the threat for water insecurity is great, because of the instability in the region and the difficult access to water supply may aggravate existing social fragility and violence.
environmental regulations and the pollution control measures are not applicable or unenforceable. It is necessary that in combination with the effort that should be made to increase the food production, strict measures shall be taken to minimize the adverse environmental impacts.105

Water security will be compromised by the consequences of climate change, as the vast majority of its impacts will be on the water cycle, resulting in higher climatic and hydrological variability. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization, changes in the hydrological cycle will threaten water infrastructure, are going to make the societies more vulnerable to extreme water related events, such as floods, droughts, acid rain etc., and that will result in an increased insecurity in many aspects. According to the above, climate change may add further threat on food production, especially on developing countries, because of their inadequacy to face those serious problems. Through scientific research and innovation, this hazard could be eliminated by using, for instance, environmentally sustainable agricultural technologies.

The improper disposal of industrial waste is another reason for food and water insecurity. 70% of the industrial waste is dumped untreated into waters from developing countries, where they pollute the usable water supply and degrade the area106, affecting water resources, increasing the risks and vulnerability to human security. That has as a consequence, a dramatic reduction of drinking water, which in long-term could result in a generalized crisis possibly a new kind of war, that one for the need for drinking water.

All of the above are not directly related to European Security, but in a way affect it, and could have a severe impact on it if they are not faced effectively. For instance, a conflict about water in the area around Europe, or the pollution of the Mediterranean Sea from Asia or Africa will affect the whole region and the consequences will be serious, including the pollution of the environment and the sea coasts. So measures should be taken in order to prevent such a catastrophe.

Threat to food and water security could also be ‘food terrorism’. Concerns have been expressed by the World Health Organization Member States regarding the possibility of biological, chemical and physical agents or radio nuclear materials being used to harm civilian populations and/or disrupting social, economic or political stability.107 It is necessary to build a system that could prevent or deter deliberate contamination of food supplies, because the effects of this could be very harmful. For instance, contamination of food in one country can also have significant effect on health in other parts of the world. In 1989, staphylococcal food poisoning in the U.S.A. was associated with eating mushrooms that have been canned in China. In 2007, shigellosis outbreaks in Australia and Denmark were linked to Thai baby corn.108 All that will lead to an economic and trade disruption in industries and countries that export and import those goods. The crisis in Belgium in which dioxin-
contaminated meat and dairy products were recalled around the world shows us the extent of disruption that a country faces in the global trade.\(^{109}\) The food safety system that exists in many countries can ensure the safety of the food supply and moreover reduce the burden of food-borne diseases.

Measures should be taken in order to prevent insecurity in the food and water field, and made in a way to be able to safeguard this for the benefit of all humanity without making any distinction. One way to achieve that goal is by developing the technology, despite the high costs that requires. It is safe to state that investment in water security is a long-term pay-off for human development and economic growth, with immediate visible short-term gains. Investing 0.6 percent of global GDP in the water sector could reduce water scarcity and halve the number of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation in less than four years, according to the UN research released in 25.04.2011.\(^{110}\) In accordance with the above, by 2030 more efficient water use will enable increased and sustainable agriculture, biofuel and industrial production. This will lead to the achievement that the number of people living in water-stressed regions will be 4 percent less than under the business as usual scenario, and 7 percent less by 2050.

New methods of water treatment for the water stressed-countries should be adopted, thus preventing a wider collapse. For instance, seawater desalination could be used. In some oil-rich countries, notably in Saudi Arabia, such a scheme has been implemented to alleviate water scarcity. But it is unlikely to become a significant source of water crop production because of its high cost of, and as a consequence food will be very expensive. Nevertheless it can be very helpful, but limited to water poor-countries and energy-rich and mainly for nonagricultural purposes.\(^{111}\)

Wastewater treatment such as reuse, recycling and artificial recharge of groundwater is widely known, but still prohibiting for the developing countries, because of its high cost. Recycle and reuse of wastewater treatment for irrigation has been implemented in some water-scarce countries and regions, but because of the inadequacy in development, has been used untreated or not properly treated wastewater, resulting in a serious health concern and soil pollution\(^{112}\), and increasing more the malfunction of the region. As this method has many negative effects, it should be used in limited areas. It could be used to a wider extent in the future as new wastewater treatment technologies will have evolved.

The World Health Organization’s Strategy for Food Safety provides a preventive approach to food safety noting the instant surveillance and rapid response to food-borne outbreaks and contamination incidents. According to that, ‘all the member states will have

\(^{109}\) Ibid.
\(^{110}\) www.unep.org
\(^{111}\) http://pubs.acs.org, Swiss Federal Institute for Environmental Science and Technology.
\(^{112}\) Ibid.
the ability to ensure the safety of their food supplies against natural and accidental threats and provides a framework for addressing terrorist threats to food.113

The European Union and the Member States have made efforts to achieve food security globally, specifically through communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 31 March 2010, which established an EU policy framework to assist developing countries in addressing food security challenges114. Through this communication, the Council underlined that ‘... the need for coordination within the E.U. and the Member States regarding different food security and nutrition initiatives, including the operationalisation of this policy framework, and invites the Commission to propose an implementation plan’.115 According to that, the European Union’s goal is to enhance the political and policy dialogue on food and nutrition security with partner countries, regional and global organizations, and promote the civil and the private sector to that movement. Furthermore it aims to promote programmes, where it could be done, by including and not limiting countries, and by identifying interventions for the E.U. and its Member States to undertake jointly or according to division of labour, to contribute to global, regional and national efforts to combat food nutrition security. The European Union’s plan is to improve the smallholder resilience and rural livelihoods, by supporting the effective governance and also the regional agriculture and food security policies. Moreover those countries could be helped by strengthening the social protection mechanisms for food and nutrition security, especially to vulnerable groups, such as mothers, infants and children.

That plan is going to be implemented via collaboration with the Member States and the countries that are in need of that help, and will be done through reports which will be presented at the annual meeting of the Committee on the World Food Security as an update of the E.U. progress.116 In that way the whole plan will be easier inspected and more effective, according to the facts that will be examined in any different case. The reports will monitor the process, as there will constantly be reviews and evaluations of the cases, which will investigate the individual qualitative and quantitative assessments. The Commission states that the effect of this plan will instigate a process to provide reliable, regular information on the interventions of the E.U. and its Member States, ensure accountability to policy commitments and further advance the aid effectiveness agenda in concrete terms.117

The commission presents a new strategy to frame the European Union’s action in countering the food insecurity in developing countries. This strategy has been presented ten years after the adoption of the Millennium Development Goal and its timeline is between 2014 and 2020.

Great efforts shall be taken to promote food and water security globally, because those encapsulate complex and interconnected challenges and highlight water and food

113 www.who.int.
114 europa.eu, Developing and cooperation - EuropeAid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Europa.eu, Boosting food nutrition security through E.U. action: implementing our commitments (Commission staff working document).
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centrality for achieving a sense of security, sustainability, development and human well-being, from the local to international level.\(^{118}\)

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The case of securitized migration in the European Union.

by Eleni Damianou

It is common knowledge that being a citizen of one of the EU countries comes with numerous privileges and freedoms. The citizens of the European Member States are free to travel to all other EU countries, stay permanently, work and enjoy the same rights as their national citizens. Since the creation of the EU, all Member States have worked hard in order to face all internal difficulties and finally create and succeed one of the Union’s main objectives; to create a common market which would lead to a European Economic Union (Barnard, 2010).

However, this picture of freedom doesn’t look the same when looking at it from outside the Union’s borders. More specifically, while focusing on a citizen from a non-EU country is like capturing the same picture but using a different lens, as the difficulties in order to enter the European region are multiple (Huysmans 2006). Border controls, face and fingerprint checks are being used in an everyday basis as tools that the Member States employ to control the movement of citizens from outside the Union and in that way increase their internal security (Neal 2009).

Since the end of the Cold War migration constitutes one serious part of the Union’s policies as it involves national and EU-level governance policies. The end of the 80’s was marked by an important influx of people in the European Union, which played a crucial role to the formation of two of the three main pillars in Maastricht’s Convention: the Common Foreign and Security, as well as the Justice and Home Affairs pillar (Huysmans 2006), which led to a securitized approach of migration. The theory of securitization explains who are the 'others' inside and outside the EU and how they are connected to politics and security (Diez 2004). In addition, another interesting topic on the matter includes Bigo’s theory of ‘Fortress Europe’, which describes how the EU is presented as a fortress to all illegal immigrants, a place where no one can enter easily (Bigo 2005).

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119 Ms. Eleni Damianou has studied International and European relations. She holds a Master’s Degree in environmental studies and currently works at an environmental consultancy as an administrative and procurement professional while she has also completed an eleven months period as a stagiaire at the European Parliament. She has a wide range of knowledge of European and environmental issues covering, environmental migration, European policies and security, environmental management and good knowledge of Geographical Information Systems (GIS). She also has excellent language skills in English and French and good knowledge of Spanish. She is one of the authors of the book “We talk about Greece” (Μιλάμε για την Ελλάδα) by Metamesonikties Ekdoseis.
1.1 Securitization of migration in the EU.

In order to understand how migration has become securitized, the securitization theory must be analyzed. Until the end of the Cold War, what constituted a security threat was the enemy of the state. This idea was expressed by the realists who dominated the international relations theory until the end of the 80's (Booth 1994). However, as the overtone of the Cold War was silenced, new concepts about new threats have started to develop. As Beck analyzes in his books, the society has been facing many unknown risks, as people's lives are threatened no matter where they are (Beck 1992). More specifically, he uses as an example the threat caused by the climatic changes on the planet as well as the nuclear danger. This approach of threat is leading to questions such as, what elements are needed for the creation of a security threat. The fact that nowadays the term 'enemy' has changed and it is taking multiple and different forms other than a person or a state indicates the big change within the logic of the security and international relations studies (Buzan 1997). Climate change and terrorism are only some of the contemporary existing threats. This approach brings out a big challenge within the security theory as it is obvious that anything can turn into a security issue. So, in order to expound this theoretical background, the Copenhagen School developed the securitization theory which basically explains how an issue can become securitized, making in that way the security agenda more broad and flexible (Williams 2003).

Moving further from the notion of the state-enemy, anything can become securitized. States are using the securitization theory in order to form the social life of their citizens. Having their citizens as the audience who will give them the legitimacy needed for the measures taken against the threat, state leaders construct discourses of power, shaping in this way the behavior of their citizens (Dalby 1990). The European Union as a team of Member States is not an exception to above practices. Migration falls under the above analysis, as after the 80's it has been shaped as one of the most challenging threats for the states, causing them to take extreme measures for its control (Waever et al. 1993). It is only normal that the difficulties are intensified for those people who wish to come to the EU in order to stay permanently as migrants because they are seen as a foreign element inside the Union’s society (Diez 2004). This is the point where the notion of the “other” comes in.

1.2 EU's “Others”

Generally, in the history of the security theory there have always been two parts: the state and its enemy who was usually another state or just “the other”. However, since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new factors as security triggers such as the climate or terrorism (Beck 1992), the securitization theory has changed. As previously referred, the securitization theory imposes that under the name of security, the states legitimize practices in order to combat a constructed threat. In order to do that, the actor needs sufficient political authority and an audience that will be the message receiver who will accept or reject these practices. However, in the EU case, things are a little blur. In the EU, this relationship between the actor and the receiver is not something clear as the audience is not the citizens of a state but a very limited one, which usually includes technocrats. The European institutions are constructed in a very complicated and multi-level way that it is difficult to separate the securitizing speakers. Different history and identities of
the member states prove that there can be no one single security discourse (Diez 2004). Acknowledging that, it is apparent that the division between the European citizens and the third-country citizens, who try to enter illegally the region, has transformed the latter to the EU’s most significant ‘other’ (Huysmans 2006).

In addition, while digging into the EU’s efforts to protect the European territory questions are raised as the general picture of the geopolitical other shifts during the years, since in unspecific periods of time, new countries enter the EU (Diez 2004).

1.3 The notion of the border under the EU context

The most common tool that is used by the EU to keep non-EU citizens out is border controls. Borders signify the power of the state to control its interior (Walters 2006). However, in the case of the EU, borders are not easy to define as there are different types of borders; the Union’s and the national borders or each EU country. The control over both borders that is being exercised by the Union, under the notion of the European Integration, has raised many questions between the Member States about their sovereignty and how much power they still have on their interior affairs. More specifically, Bigo mentions that “states are conceived as networks of power and no longer as bordered power containers” (Bigo 2005, 55) leading to the idea of the general blur of borders and the creation of new ways to deal with migration. The most obvious strategy to control illegal migration is the creation of European security agencies that are charged with the responsibility to control the borders and the internal security of the EU by extinguishing any kind of threat at a distance (Bigo 2000). Frontex is the most famous European security agency responsible for the surveillance of the Union’s external borders, leaving however their responsibility to the Member States (Bialasiewicz et al. 2009). New technologies such as fingerprint databases and face controls take place away from the EU borders, shaping the disengagement of state control in the borders (Walters 2006).

1.4 Trade agreements with migrant-sending countries.

For the EU, migration is a rather complex issue because it is not treated equally the same by the EU countries. Indeed, it is treated differently within the EU countries as the majority of immigrants tries to enter the region from the southern EU countries other than from the northern part (Huysmans 2006). This is why the southern EU countries prefer to deal with migration by using national level solutions since they can treat the issue more directly and quickly. On the opposite, the northern countries support a general European policy and prefer to address the issue on a European level (Chou 2009).

Generally, the only type of migration that is accepted and facilitated by the EU is the legal one (Bialasiewicz et al. 2009). On the other hand, the Union uses many ways to deal with illegal migration. One of the most known strategies is developing agreements with third countries, especially in the Northern part of Africa and Eastern Europe. These agreements take the form of trade facilitations or other economic agreements where the EU will provide assistance and become an important economic partner of those countries while the latter will have to deal with illegal migrants before they even have the chance to reach the EU borders (Bilgic 2011).
1.5 Border Management via Frontex

As previously mentioned, the most important European strategy to control and keep the borders safe is the general strengthening of the European border surveillance system that deals in an everyday basis with migration issues. Frontex is the European Agency responsible for the security of the EU’s borders and cooperates with the border police of the Member States and their neighbor non-EU countries (Neal 2009).

After 2007, the EU tries to reinforce Frontex in order to be able to deal with irregular migration, especially in its Mediterranean borders. The main aim is the agency to be able to develop good relations with all neighbor countries and other European Agencies such as the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) via a network of exchanging information (European Commission 2007). After 2011, an extensive focus on the combat against illegal migration via Frontex is observed, since the EU has begun to realize that global trends like climate change and the environment will put an even bigger pressure on the EU’s borders, as due to extensive severe climate conditions, people who live in climatic vulnerable spots will have to migrate in order to go to a more prosperous land (Frontex 2011).

However, although Frontex is responsible for the border management, the main responsibility belongs to the Member States. In a few words, it seems that the Member States are the ones mainly responsible for their borders, while Frontex acts in their accordance by assisting them in the guarding of their borders. Specifically, in the Mediterranean basin, Frontex has installed the Mediterranean Coast Patrols Network, in order to assist the southern EU countries (European Council 2005). Under the threat of future increase of both regular and irregular migration because of various drivers of global change such as natural disasters and global change, Frontex focuses on the strengthening of these countries’ capacity to manage illegal migration as areas in both Africa and the Middle East are expected to be more affected (European Commission 2008).

1.6 Illegal Immigration and the ‘fortress’ caricature

The theory of ‘fortress Europe’ explains the European fear of illegal ‘invasion’ (Guild 2004) which was mentioned in the section of the Europe’s “Others”. Bigo is one of the academics who focused on this theory of the fortress. Under this concept, Bigo analyzes the term of ‘ban-opticon’ (as opposed to Foucault’s pan-opticon) as “a form of governmentality, where the EU, in a proactive logic, manages through technologies all migration influxes” (Bigo 2005, 86). Under the ban-opticon term Bigo presents the efforts made by the EU to ban every kind of irregular migration as it is a type of migration linked to illegal activities and even terrorism (Bigo 2005).

1.7 Migration: a multi-faceted globalized phenomenon

Migration has always been a challenge for the EU since it is one of the most basic areas of migrant destination. Countries such as Greece, Italy and Malta are presented as the main areas where European migration policies must be implemented. Cooperation and “a political dialogue between the EU, Africa and other regional organizations” (European Commission 2007) is the main focus by the Union. Specifically, the EU’s Global Approach to Migration, launched in 2005 is based on dialogue and cooperation between the EU and other regions in order to build capacity to manage migration flows by providing assistance to
other countries' development sector (European Council 2005). The main objective is to assist third countries in their efforts to decrease the possibilities for their citizens to leave their homeland by funding development projects that increase people's resilience (Adepoju et al. 2010).

The economic reform of the most vulnerable countries along with the Union’s development policies consist also a part of the general migration policies since when a country is prosperous in economic and development level, its citizens have no reason to migrate (European Commission 2008). This is merely why the European Union is presented as the most powerful partner in the global political scene, especially in issues of international aid and support. Political coordination, crisis management and sustainable development projects are the basic approaches by the EU in terms of all kinds of migration (European Commission 2010).

1.8 Economic and social crisis

The economic crisis that has stricken the EU has also played a vital role in the migration policies. The Europeans have decreased the funding to third countries, as they have turned their attention to the EU’s internal market and economy which constitutes the central engine from where all the money are being drained. In Frontex's Annual Risk Analysis of 2012 it is mentioned that the current economic hardship of some of the EU countries, which happen also to be the same countries that have to deal with the biggest numbers of migrants and asylum seekers, will inevitably decrease their capacity to deal with border issues (Frontex 2012). Unfortunately, the incapability of Member States to secure the economic future and prosperity of their citizens has a negative impact on the migrant population as they come in second place. Funds that were directed either to migrants’ integration within the EU countries or to projects aimed at the development of third countries are dramatically decreased, strengthening in that way the difficulties of the vulnerable population both inside and outside of the EU.

The economic crisis in the EU has also led to a social crisis since it has raised various questions about the EU identity and more specifically about the feeling that the EU citizens share that they belong in one common group and how they define themselves in a social whole (Guild 2004).

1.9 Conclusion

As a conclusion to the above analysis, migration has been indeed securitized in the Union. The most characteristic proof is the strengthening of the European border surveillance authority, Frontex, which assists the EU countries with migration issues. Illegal migration is targeted by the EU while the main objective is the facilitation of legal migration aiming at integration of all legal migrants in the EU countries. On the contrast, illegal immigration lies at the other end, as it is treated as a problem that threatens to undermine the European internal security and cohesion. As already mentioned, the main objective of the European Union for the case of migration is the facilitation of legal migration which is the only accepted type of migration (Chou 2009).
Although, the EU puts an unprecedented effort to promote legal migration and contribute to the integration of those people who legally resign in its Member States, at the same time it also strengthens the border controls and surveillance of its territory.
Chapter 2: List of references

Revisiting Energy Security in EU

by Christianna Liountri

According to the IEA, in 2020, the European import dependency is expected to reach 90% for oil and 63% for natural gas, in comparison to 50% for oil and 36% for natural gas in 2000. The debate over the ways through which the EU would secure its energy supplies came again on the top of the (security) agenda after the consecutive Russia-Ukraine “Gas Wars” of 2006 and 2009, that ended up to the disruption of energy supplies - for the first time- to the countries of the European Union.

Arguably, geo-economic competition and conflict over energy resources appears to be another source of international tension and hazard that further weakens the over-optimistic arguments that followed the end of the bipolar confrontation. “The current focus on resource reflects the growing importance of industrial might and the economic dimensions of security”\(^{121}\). Given that the pace of globalization exceed the governance potential of the EU in its current form and the fact that power is directly associated with economic dynamism and the cultivation of technological innovation, the stakes for the European institutions have risen with the challenge being far more crucial than the vague commitments to protect human rights and to promote common political and social values. It is essential for Europe to develop policies that would enable it to face on equal terms its newly industrialized energy competitors, such as China and India, and maintain its role in the international system.

Energy security is defined as: “assurance of the ability to access the energy resources required for the continued development of national power. In more specific terms, it is the provision of affordable, reliable, diverse, and ample supplies of oil and gas (and their future equivalents) and adequate infrastructure to deliver these supplies to market.(...) Affordable energy means the ability to buy supply at relatively stable as well as reasonable prices. (...) A reliable energy supply means predictable supplies that are less and less vulnerable to disruptions.(...) Accessing the diverse and ample supplies means ensuring that a large number of nations with hydrocarbon reserves produce them for the global markets. (...) Energy security means both the ability to secure supplies and the ability to insulate the global economy from the effects of extreme price volatility.”\(^{122}\)

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Resources are tangible assets that can be exposed to risk by political turmoil and conflict abroad. The problem of politically motivated supply disruptions as a tool to achieve objectives in the international arena dates back to 1973-1974 and the oil embargo enforced by the OPEC countries as a means to punish the US for their support to Israel during the Yom-Kipur War. Then the crisis was dealt with the creation of national oil stocks. Drawing a parallel to the current situation, security of energy supplies requires the development of such foreign policy’s – and to a lesser extent, military- capabilities that would provide each state with sufficient tools to avoid any disturbances to the flow of oil and natural gas.

The EU, consisting of independent states, reluctant to move closer and abandon their sovereignty for a more federalized union, lacks a coherent foreign policy and the will to develop it. Given that energy ties in with core national interests, it is highly doubtful if this field will be used as a platform to achieve further integration.

Nevertheless, certain steps were undertaken at a European level, aiming at the creation of a common energy policy. Most of them are examined under a perspective of “Markets and Institutions” in contrast to that of “Regions and Empires” - towards the last one have shifted the US. The “Markets and Institutions” perspective is an economist approach, inspired by a neo-liberal school of thought, seeking the creation of an energy market as a self-regulating mechanism of energy security. Under the “Markets and Institutions” perspective falls EU’s efforts to consolidate the Internal Energy Market and its efforts to develop strong relationships with energy producing and transit countries in order to achieve an equilibrium point for supply from each geographic region.

The most profound example of EU’s effort to emerge as a global leader in the energy field is the Energy Charter, a political declaration on international energy cooperation. “It is the only body of legally binding international rules that is tailored specifically to the energy sector. (...) [it] offers a depoliticised, energy - specific international forum which is unique in that it brings together producing, consuming and transit countries. (...) One of the main aims

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124 “Regions and Empires” is an approach that moves towards the realistic school of IR, dividing the world into countries and regions, “on the basis of ideology, religion and political arguments. Political and military strategy, bilateralism and regionalism divide the world up into competing US, Russian and Asian spheres of influence. National and international security concerns and conflicts impede international economic integration, through the regulation of activities and the control over flows of goods, persons and capitals”, Aad Correlje, Coby van der Linde, “Energy Supply Security and geopolitics: A European Perspective”, Energy Policy 34 (2006), 532-543

125 Aurelia Mane Estrada, “European Energy Security: Towards the creation of the geo-energy space”, Energy Policy 34, 2006, 3773-3786, p. 3775

of the treaty is to promote the predictability and transparency that allows for the huge investments needed for our (i.e. European) future energy security.” The main drawbacks of this effort are that it is not binding; that Russia – the main energy provider of Europe- has not signed it; that it is generally perceived from the producer countries as a means through which the EU tries to export its regulations and bind them to a legal status that limits their flexibility without visible gains, especially now that energy consumers - competitors to Europe, such as China and India, have made a dynamic appearance in the global energy map, offering a more flexible negotiation framework, by far less complicated and restrictive than the European one.

European Commission, trying to assert its role in the field, has issued several papers -non binding nevertheless- in order to present guidelines for its member-states. The paper “An energy policy for Europe” outlines the basic points of the European Energy Policy. It is based on the objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply. Sustainability is directly linked to climate change and focuses on the development of the field of renewable sources of energy. Regarding competitiveness, European Commission proposes market liberalization, rise of investments in the energy sector along with the consolidation of an internal energy market based on fair and competitive prices. Security of supply is the last element of European energy security and the most sensible one, since for its accomplishment it requires a collective, viable common policy that exceeds national boundaries.

However, European Commission’s attempts to align its member states and present itself with one voice in the globalized energy market have fallen into the void. First and foremost, within the European Union, we are presented with “blocks” of countries according to who is the provider of oil or gas, where geography -and geopolitics- appear to play a very important role. On the one hand, former soviet countries (the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) are suspicious and skeptical towards Russia, whose (assertive) energy policy is perceived as a means to reestablish its control to the former soviet sphere of influence. Such a notion is justified on the basis that all Russian natural gas and oil exports are controlled by state controlled firms. On the other hand, companies from individual EU countries are

130 It is important to outline that Russia after the financial crisis of 1998 which left it vulnerable to external destabilizing factors, has moved towards a policy that focuses on energy as the primary source of revenue, with which almost every aspect of the financial sector is linked. Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, who wishes to see Russia regaining its place as a great power, energy has become the cornerstone of his policy: he has created a Savings Fund on which the revenues of oil and gas exports are deposited and used to support Russia’s welfare system, investments and so on. While examining Russia’s policy, we observe a trend to avoid transit countries in order to save more money, develop its own infrastructure and present itself as a reliable exporter. We need to bare in mind that the (energy) relation between Russia and EU is one of interdependence: Russia needs
more than willing to sign long-term bilateral agreements to secure energy supplies from Russia (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Greece and of course Italy and Germany which are the largest importers of Russian natural gas). A conclusion that can be reached, based on the statistics given by Eurostat, is that EU presents the trend of limiting its imports from Russia, particularly after 2006, but not necessarily due to threat perceptions. For the most part, those efforts were directed at the Caspian Sea Region, which may hold the greatest potential for new natural gas supplies for Europe, but currently supplies in Central Asia have to transit Russia to arrive in the European market.  

Another setback is the legal status of the Caspian which remains unsettled. In an attempt to overcome the issue along with the will of Central Asian countries — which all share a tradition of authoritarian and corrupt regimes — to look east rather than west to bypass Russia and open new markets, EU has initiated the Southeastern Corridor: a non-Russian, non-Iranian natural gas pipeline system to transport natural gas from the Caspian region and Central Asia to Europe. Within the context of the Southeastern Corridor, the importance of Turkey as a strategic partner to Europe's security is once again highlighted.

Europe and Europe needs Russia. To move a step forward, the EU needs to worry about Russia's ability to deliver sufficient quantities of gas and oil to the European market. That is due to the lack of investments in the research for new fields and infrastructure that can cover the rising demand of the EU.


132 Before the collapse of the USSR, legal rights on the Caspian Sea had Iran and USSR. After the collapse of the USSR, the Caspian littoral states rised up to 5, namely Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia.
New Threats and Challenges for European Security

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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: nrg_122a, nrg_123a and nrg_124a)

An argument put forward in the dialogue concerning EU – Russia's energy relations, is the requirement of reciprocity. Russia, which is running out of “cheap oil” (oil that can be extracted and processed easily and at a low cost), needs to know that financing the capital expenditure needed to develop new production capacity will pay back. Russia needs to be reassured that in the EU's market, is going to find a stable customer. “Obviously Russia will not have strong incentives to invest massive sums in the development of new fields and transport infrastructure without having signed appropriate long-term contracts”.

In another area of interest, geographical proximity and the vast resources of the Middle East have made inevitable the increased interconnection of EU with the countries of the Middle East. So far, EU's energy cooperation initiatives with regard to the Middle East are located within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, policy dialogues with the Gulf

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133 Main origin of primary energy imports, EU-27, 2002-2010, Eurostat


135 Ibid, p.74
Cooperation and bilateral overtures towards individual states. “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership refers to energy cooperation under its Economic and Financial Partnership plank and concentrates on harmonization of energy markets in the Euromed region; promotion of sustainable development, infrastructure extension and investment financing; and strengthening of research and development programs. The priorities of the Euro-Med Energy Partnership aim to accelerate reform in the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean with a view to the gradual integration of the EuroMed electricity and gas markets; increase security and safety of energy supplies, infrastructure and oil shipping; strengthen energy interconnections.”  

An interesting case study that reveals the direct connection of political stability with energy security is the Arab Spring. The regime changes that took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and the protests in Algeria vibrated the energy market. As explained by Gawdat Bahgat, domestic consumption and foreign investment are likely to be negatively affected by the Arab Spring. It is generally argued that Arab countries’ economies are dictated by oil and gas revenues. For Arab regimes to secure legitimacy, the tendency to technically keep the prices low in order to cover domestic consumption has been transformed to a wide-spread policy that jeopardizes the long-term stockholding. Regarding the foreign investments, bearing in mind that European Oil Companies are not state owned but private, they fall under the principle of the free market that wants political stability for the investor to be attracted. European energy market has taken important steps towards liberalization. Thus, EU’s tools to dictate to these companies where to invest are limited. That being the case, EU needs to politically intervene to achieve such conditions that will attract investors to the Middle Eastern countries, essential to Europe’s energy security.

This region is one of the main reminders of the reasons why the EU needs to further develop its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDA). The volatility of the internal and regional affairs in the Middle East demands for a cohesive strategy of prevention, deterrence, containment and crisis management in order to deal with an unstable political environment. The Middle East preserves its importance due to its rich resources, geographical advantages and its potential to stabilize world market prices in line with its oil supply capacity. In order to successfully deal with political crises that may occur to these countries, the EU needs to develop a wider spectrum of efficient and robust mechanisms that will decisively tackle problems that fall within its jurisdiction - resembling to the (national) diplomatic mechanisms formed to address international crises.

138 We cannot but refer to the “resource curse”: “countries supposedly wealthier than others show worse results, in terms of economic advances and poverty reduction, than other countries which did not enjoy this apparent advantage. International economic organizations advice the creation of stabilization and saving funds, whose main purpose is to turn oil assets into financial assets, so that the exporting countries can invest them in the international capital markets.”, Aurelia Mane Estrada, “ European Energy Security: Towards the creation of the geo-energy space”, Energy Policy 34 (2006), 3773-3786
However, such a suggestion revives the division between those who support the idea of a more independent “European” security policy and those who have no intention even to imagine a Europe more independent from the military protection of the US (Atlanticists). Given that under President Obama, American foreign policy has shifted its weight and attention to the East and the Pacific, leaving a largely unprepared EU to cope with the crisis in the Middle East, CSDA may get the necessary boost. For CSDA to rise up to these expectations, it is essential that it is not perceived as a means of NATO’s exclusion. Rather, under the pretext of energy security, NATO could be integrated in the European institutions. It is suggested that NATO’s involvement in dealing with energy security threats would improve the deterrent image of the EU since it would bring on the table of negotiations the diplomatic and military leverage of the US, which remains the only state with sufficient military capability to credibly defend or intervene in energy producing areas. Furthermore, NATO could be involved in more practical terms, providing support to communications, intelligence sharing and interoperability, training and advice on infrastructure protection. Needless to say that NATO's involvement must be carefully orchestrated in order to avoid the rise in threat perceptions of producing states, and particularly Russia.

To reach a conclusion, the aim of this paper was to highlight both the reasons and the necessities for a more integrated EU, at least in the field of energy. The current international conjuncture leaves the member states with no other viable alternatives. The international system becomes rapidly competitive and its members must have at their disposal functional and efficient solutions to meet the challenges it poses.

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Cyber Threats: The invisible enemy

By Stamatis Zachariadis

Introduction

Cyberspace is an interconnected environment where opportunities can be found in abundance for individuals and organized groups who seek profit or attention. At the same time however, due to its structure, it also hides many dangers and risks for its users regardless if they are governments, private companies or individuals. Some key findings from the Symantec 2013 report are revealing:

- 42% increase in targeted attacks in 2012.
- 31% of all targeted attacks aimed at businesses with less than 250 employees.
- One waterhole attack infected 500 organizations in a single day.
- 14 zero-day vulnerabilities.
- 32% of all mobile threats steal information.
- A single threat infected 600,000 Macs in 2012.
- Spam volume continued to decrease, with 69% of all email being spam.
- The number of phishing sites spoofing social networking sites increased 125%.
- Web-based attacks increased 30%.
- 5,291 new vulnerabilities discovered in 2012, 415 of them on mobile operating systems.

Carl von Clauzewitz argued in his masterpiece ‘Vom Kriege’ that in warfare defense is more powerful than the attack. In cyber warfare this equation is reversed. Additionally, the fog of war becomes thicker through deception, surprise, disruption and confusion (Farwell and Rohozinski: 2012)

Cyber weapons come in many forms and extend to a wide range. It begins from generic but low potential tools and it reaches to specific but high potential weaponry. There is also a significant ‘grey area’ in between that includes either weaponised or non-weaponised software.

140 Stamatis Zachariadis holds his MA in International Politics and Europe from the University of Warwick. He is a Research Associate in the Department of Euro-Atlantic Studies for 3 years covering the EU and NATO areas of interest. He has worked for the Ministry of Defence and currently works as an analyst for HSBC on Global Markets.

141 Symantec Internet Threat Report 2013
The purpose of this essay is to delineate cyber warfare as a challenge for European security. In the first part, we aim at presenting why cyber attacks are of such great importance. The theoretical analysis will be supported by citing incidents that took place only recently. In the second part, we will critically examine the initiatives taken so far from the two major European security institutions, NATO and the EU. The essay will be concluded by outlining a number of proposals we consider appropriate.

**Why Cyber Weapons are a threat?**

Due to its structure, the cyber space is a huge network that consists of million other smaller networks. This structure, like any other has inherent flaws which can be exploited from a wide range of actors with different motives. Additionally, this ‘network of networks’ structure hides vulnerabilities that are still undiscovered and pose significant risk to the parties involved. Above all, we should mention the human factor and its involvement that can create problems of equal importance to the technical ones. For some researchers the human factor is considered the most important than the technical one, because you can create the best software or hardware but humans will always be flawed by nature.

The main reason cyber attacks occur are the following (Robinson et al: 2013):

1) Economic benefits
2) Pre-emptive attacks
3) Economic, industrial and military espionage
4) Attracting attention

On the attacking side we can find a variety of actors like criminals, states/intelligence agencies, proxies, state sponsored criminals, non-state actors and hackers acting either as lone wolves or in groups. On the defensive side usually are large corporate companies and military or public infrastructure/facilities. For the attacks can be used low potential techniques like Distributed Denial of Service attacks or sophisticated weaponised software. We are going to cite a few incidents to present how important cyber security is and the extent of technical and psychological damage each could do.

**Estonia 2007**

In late April 2007 the Estonian government decided to move the Bronze soldier (a Soviet Second World War memorial of the Unknown Soldier) from the city centre to its outskirts. This provoked fierce reactions from both Estonia’s Russian speaking population and Russia itself. On Friday 27th of April cyber attacks (ping floods and DDoS attacks) started against Estonia. Through the extensive use of Botnets the volume of the attacks increased in three days (Rid and McBurney: 2012). Up to 85,000 hijacked computers unleashed a massive wave of DDoS attacks that peaked on May 9th (celebration of Russia’s Victory Day). The result was the collapse of Estonia’s largest bank online services for two hours and around sixty other Estonian websites were down at once. Although the impact of the attack was
noticeable in Estonian businesses, government and society it was also minor. The psychological impact however was major as the majority of the Estonians were truly scared (Ibid). The interesting part of this attack is that although it was commanded by cyber criminals there are strong evidence that relates them with the Russian state.

**Stuxnet**

Stuxnet is the most sophisticated cyber weapon and the first one to do physical damage. The Stuxnet cyber worm is part of a larger operation called *Olympic Games* launched by USA and Israel against Iran. Its main purpose was not the gathering of intelligence data but to disrupt Iran’s nuclear programme. It is a highly sophisticated cyber weapon that before actually sabotaging the Natanz centrifuges “*it intercepted input values from sensors, for instance the state of a valve or operating temperatures, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, while the actual processes in the hidden background were manipulated.*” (Ibid)

Stuxnet stands out for three other reasons. Firstly, it did not cause severe collateral damage. Although there is a belief that viruses infecting aggressively computers are also causing irreparable damage, this was not the case with Stuxnet. It did infect more than 100,000 Windows hosts but no damage was inflicted on these computers. Secondly, there was a significant amount of intelligence embedded in the executable file of Stuxnet. The reason why this happened was that the final target was not networked (air gapped). Lastly, although highly sophisticated Stuxnet was not a learning intelligent agent meaning that the next generation of cyber weapons will be able to “*observe and evaluate the specifics of an isolated environment autonomously, analyse available courses of action and then take action.*” (Ibid)

It is apparent that both attacks directed against a state from other states inflicted serious technical and psychological damage that in other circumstances could have been sufficient for declaring war.

**EU Strategy**

On February 7 2013 the EEAS released a document that contained the ingredients of a European Cyber Security Strategy. Acknowledging the dangers that lurk in cyber space the document set five priorities:

- Achieving cyber resilience
- Drastically reducing cybercrime
- Developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
- Developing the industrial and technological resources for cyber-security
• Establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promoting core EU values.

It is an ambitious document because it aims at establishing cooperation between three different policy areas: EEAS, Law Enforcement and Digital Agenda.

Aside that, the strategy calls for every member-state to have a full-fledged CERT team as well a competent authority to speak on behalf of the country on EU-level discussions. This will require a significant amount of effort since CERTS usually operate under a weak legal basis and they cannot easily share data outside their borders of authority even with international organizations.

The paper aspires to enhance public-private partnership which in our opinion is of critical importance if the objective is to counter effectively cyber security threats. According to the Strategy paper, the EP3R can be used as a platform to achieve this objective. But Neil Robinson remains skeptical stating that: “The EP3R has been in existence for several years now, but it faces challenges over its direction and participation, and it lacks a sufficiently robust and diverse group of stakeholders (especially end users of technology)”. Although ENISA has attempted to breathe new life into the EP3R it remains unclear if the industry stakeholders are convinced that this is the best channel to influence policymakers in Brussels.

Lastly, the paper seeks to establish a single common framework for the contributions of defence and foreign policy to cyber security. This is the idea that clearly stands out because the member-states are extremely cautious in protecting their sovereignty in these two policy areas. Although the EU has a relatively fresh cyber defence concept, the member states’ capabilities leave a lot to be desired in terms of doctrine, organization and training.

This is supported by a study carried out by RAND where the picture of cyber defence at EU level can be best described as mixed and diverse. Responsibility for cyber defence operations is split into three EU bodies, the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the EU Council and the Commission. Capabilities concerning threat analysis, cyber intelligence and incident response are still at early stages (Robinson et al: 2013).

The study has divided cyber defence capabilities into seven domains: Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, Personnel, Interoperability and Facilities. The 20 member states participating in the study were evaluated in these domains as: Optimised, Balanced, Defined, Initial or Non-Existent (Ibid)

The EU average results are satisfactory regarding Personnel management, vetting, recruitment and retention policies. The same also applies in Leadership (existence of escalation mechanisms for national level cyber defence incidents) and Interoperability (existence of frameworks or schemes that support information flow across defence organizations and wider public administrations). However concerning the capabilities in the other four domains, there is a lot space for progress if the desired results are to be achieved (Ibid).
NATO’s Initiatives

The increasing awareness of these attacks among NATO, the European Union and their member states has led cyber issues to become prominent in these institutions’ security agendas. As early as in 2002, in the Prague Summit, NATO leaders resolved to “strengthen their capabilities to defend against cyber attacks”. In the “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Active Engagement, Modern Defence”, in Lisbon (2010) there had been recognized the need to combat cyber attacks; cyber issues are prominent throughout the resulting text.

NATO’s cyber initiatives were not limited to verbal pursuits: In 2002, the Prague Summit established the Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) that reports to the NATO Communications and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA). It is set up and expected to be fully operational by the end of 2012. Furthermore, the official NATO Cyber Defence Policy was approved in January 2008. As a result, the Cooperation Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE) was created. Another fully operational entity was established: the Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA). NATO’s response to cyber attacks is anticipated to prove sufficient in terms of organization and structure effectiveness, since the operational mechanisms are gradually integrating into NATO’s Defence Planning Process.

Although pursued, it is argued that the aspired goal of a common response against cyber attacks is realizable. NATO’s member states have developed their own mechanisms to mediate the results of cyber attacks against them. Note that as the years pass by, aggressive cyber activities are being multiplied, but the nation-states fail to apply effective measures in practice. But again, military networks are neither identical to civilian ones, nor is it certain that they could even be accessed via the Internet; therefore, not every civilian threat is imminent to affect military targets.

In contrast, state networks are subjected to the same threats as civilian. Therefore, NATO Defence Ministers adopted a new cyber defence policy that introduced a centralised protection in 2011. It is yet to be evaluated whether that option would be favourable to the interests of the member states; all of which are not currently dependent on NATO to provide their cyber defence.

A complementary strategy that would lead to common norms of crisis management would be desirable as it would enhance the collective response and awareness of the allies. That could be the harmonization and the coordination of NATO’s member states. After the Estonian cyber crisis (2007) NATO had not reached consensus, so the clause of collective defence under the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would still not be triggered due to cyber attacks. Estonia had brought its matter before the North Atlantic Council, the highest body of the NATO military alliance but its view was not shared by the majority of the member states: The 2007 attack on Estonia did not merit invocation of the Treaty’s collective-defence clauses unless cyber threats would be followed by physical attacks, as happened in Georgia in 2008. Instead, Article 4 of the Treaty that calls for collaboration and consulting is applicable.
In other words, NATO is not likely to go on the offence; so a defensive response is out of the question for now. The means for such actions remain nation-based. We have not reached assuring levels of identification of the attackers. Therefore, the ramifications from the strategic use of cyber technology as a response would maybe turn an increasing number of foes against NATO, such as anti-state partisans. In addition, that would demand NATO to be able to estimate and control the escalation of the attacks. It is argued that first NATO does not seek such a role; second NATO does not have a retaliation strategy; third the nature of the asymmetric attacks against NATO renders the response to most of these cyber attacks impossible or extremely costly. A threat that cannot be denied would better be addressed by defence (Martin: 2012).

While cyber defence capabilities are limited, the targets are countless. A threat for NATO and the EU could be domestic computers being operated in remote; most times their legitimate operators are unaware of their computers being incubated with malware – that was the case in Estonia (2007). NATO has prolonged its cooperation with its partners, but the security of households and enterprises is also suffering by cyber attacks. The Estonian cyber incident has raised awareness in many governments and large companies about the importance of guarding against digital threats. It would be to the benefit of the Organization to extend its practices to public awareness and funding of measures to civilian protection. If it is required in the future, NATO should promote peer-to-peer integration among the allies. Thus, the Trans-Atlantic cyber space would be further connected among the American and European enterprises as well. The construction of a new NATO built architecture not susceptible to attacks and intrusion will surely be a great challenge but the question remains whether it would be sufficient.

The way ahead

It is evident from both the analysis and the data presented that cyber security will be a top priority issue for the current decade and the ones to come. We also strongly believe that prevention is the best medicine, but to build an effective prevention a comprehensive strategy supported by successful policies should be formed.

The first step should be taken on national level where governments should design and formulate a doctrine for cyber warfare. The doctrine should be endowed with all the necessary political, military and legal assets. Public and private collaboration is a sine qua non for a successful doctrine. The following series of actions is likely to form an effective “cyber defence” doctrine for EU and NATO. The first action would be the detection of the threat and then the prevention of the attack. NATO should be capable to address and repair the incoming attacks that were not prevented. The subsequent defence would deprive the attacker of the prey of the cyber attack or would manage the spoils of the attack rapidly. NATO would better deny the benefits of cyber attacks, therefore providing cyber deterrence by denial. Thus, it would not have to face the uncertainty of escalating counter-attacks. That concept may be revolutionary to the ethically questionable world of cyberspace, where every action is not treated as baring a destructive counterpart.
The second step is to develop the necessary cyber security infrastructure and provide the civilian and military personnel with adequate training.

The last step is to establish consultations and exchange of information on regular basis from heads of state to military and civilian personnel. EU and NATO have already enabled structures that can facilitate this.

The aftermath of the Estonian incident highlights the fact that very few, if none, European countries can stand alone against coordinated cyber attacks. The answer will come by improving national capabilities within the frameworks of EU and NATO.

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